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The insider threat is a global problem that impacts organizations and produces a gamut of 
undesired outcomes. Businesses often experience lost revenue and stolen trade secrets, 
which can leave a tarnished reputation. Insider threats can also cause harm to individuals 
and national security.  
Past efforts have not mitigated the problem in its entirety. Documented instances of 
insider threats are as recent as March 2020. Many researchers have focused on 
monitoring technologies and relying on human monitoring in a reactive posture. An ideal 
solution would scrutinize an individual’s character and ascertain whether unique traits 
associated with actors of insider threats are apparent within the preemployment vetting 
process.  
 
This study leveraged various input data streams and applied theory-driven behaviors that 
are associated with fraudulent activities. The research followed a Design Science 
Research (DSR) methodology to produce sentiment analysis of IT artifacts, and ranked 
individuals’ level of trustworthiness, conducive within the hiring process.  
Lab experiments were used to answer the research questions, provided valuable insight 
with fraudulent activities, and discovered commonalities with negative sentiments found 
in social media tweets. First, literature was defined and reviewed to address mitigation of 
insider threats in one form or another. Second, artifacts were from the sum of all data 
components; these artifacts proved to be informative during the construction within each 
lab experiment. Finally, the lab experiments provided helpful contributions to the study. 
For instance, across all lab experiments, common themes emerged from four negative 
sentiment scores. These scores were later illustrated under the S140-negScore, AFINN-
negScore, SentiWordnet-negScore, and NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore. Behavioral theories 
did not always appear within each artifact; however, the routine activity theory was the 
most prevalent and was detailed in the lab experiments.  
The research extends previous and relevant research, thus leveraging social inputs and 
fraudulent data extracted from the legal system as a foundation for a way forward. An 
insider threat can be mitigated through leveraging social media data. 
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Insider threats pose significant security risks within organizations; this specific 
threat is nothing new. The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (2015) defines 
insider threats as follows:  
The threat presented by a person who has, or once had, authorized access to 
information, facilities, networks, people, or resources; and who wittingly, or 
unwittingly, commits: acts in contravention of law or policy that resulted in, or 
might result in, harm through the loss or degradation of government or company 
information, resources, or capabilities; or destructive acts, to include physical 
harm to others in the workplace. (para. 3) 
Organizations place focus on monitoring solutions and appear to operate 
reactively. Proactive approaches to security may be more beneficial than reactive 
approaches (Hunker & Probst, 2011). Statistics have captured reported instances of 
insider threats; however, some cases are not reported due to ethical laws and sanctions 
issued by the government (Oladimeji, Ayo, & Adewumi, 2019). 
To this end, this dissertation study does not represent an end-all solution to insider 
threat mitigation. Instead, it addressed why past attempts to mitigate insider threats have 
failed and provided an alternative approach to alleviate the problem by leveraging data 
from social platforms. Organizational leaders could ascertain whether an individual might 
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be considered a security threat at the earliest onset and before employment within this 
context. 
Problem Statement 
Insider threats are a problem. Powers’ (2017) brief literature review documented a 
case of an insider threat in the financial sector in 1792. Other forms of insider threats 
dated back to 41 A.D.  
This dissertation study’s review of relevant literature revealed various avenues 
and approaches to standard practices to address insider threat mitigation efforts; however, 
the literature fell short of effectively addressing the problem. Organizations have invested 
heavily in deterrence monitoring tools to observe employees’ activities, such as computer 
access, Internet browsing, and e-mail communications (Alahmadi, Legg, & Nurse, 2015), 
yet requires monitoring resources, and can become an ineffective strategy. According to 
Loffi and Wallace (2014), employee monitoring for insider threat activities should be 
used cautiously with concerns for lapses in enthusiasm and suspicion of leadership. 
To further combat the insider threats, Cole (2015) suggested that organizations 
implement administrative policies, procedures, Internet audits, workforce monitoring, 
whistleblower incentives, and put strategies in place for data loss prevention. Individuals 
who cause insider threats are aware of the policies, procedures, and technology used in 
their organizations and are often also aware of the organization’s vulnerabilities 
(Cappelli, Moore, Trzeciak, & Shimeall, 2009). Auditing can also impact policy 
enforcement. Auditing often results in redundant, misleading, and missing data; even 
worse, audit trails typically lack time correlation (Hunker & Probst, 2011).  
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Effective information security cannot be delivered only by perfecting the 
effectiveness of technical controls (Ismail & Yusof, 2018) and goes beyond technological 
aspects. Attempts to mitigate an insider threat that is solely based on technology could 
fail and operates during or after a threat. Methodologies of the past had weaknesses, 
exploitable flaws, and demonstrate a need to foster new approaches.  
This dissertation study leveraged an additional source of data to supplement 
existing mitigation efforts. As outlined in the research process, the IT artifact creation 
(see Figure 1) included information collected through fraudulent legal cases. In these 
instances, the social components from fraud was leveraged to provide a better 
understanding of the cohesion within social media data (with permission of the author).  
 
Figure 1. Modified IT artifact. Reprinted from “Considering the social impacts of 
artefacts in information systems design science research” by G. De Leoz and S. Petter, 
2018, European Journal of Information Systems, 27(2), 154–170. Copyright 2018 by 
Taylor and Francis. Adapted with permission.  
 
Many types of insider threat classifications must be considered. Shaw, Ruby, and 
Post (1998) pointed out vulnerabilities associated with introversion, computer 
dependency, social and personal frustrations, ethics, entitlement, lack of empathy, and 
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reduced loyalty. The classifications can become exhaustive; therefore, the focus of this 
study was related to generalized fraudulent activities through court transcripts.  
Court transcripts with cases involving forms of fraud, illuminated schemes, and 
tactics used in carrying out crimes and shows relevance to this study’s interpretation with 
behavioral theories. For example, a corrupt security executive’s scheme included giving 
himself  his regular paycheck, then later would write a second paycheck, a forged check 
(Glackin & Bible, 2019). The case blatantly lists the defendant’s fraudulent behaviors 
through multiple counts of felony theft and forgery. In this instance, information on fraud 
is also illustrated through court documentation and appears to be a great source for 
supportive information.   
While an initial assessment into insider threats is understood, ways with dealing 
with the threat appears to remain a serious problem worth solving. Data collections from 
various sources can hold the key to detecting the threat from much earlier in the 
mitigation cycle. The integration of innovative data collections from the courts, analysis 
of social media data, and applying the behavioral theories can provide a clear picture to 
represent possible insider threat characteristics.   
One could postulate that data extracted specifically from prosecuted cases 
involving various forms of fraud can show relevancy to different behavioral theories and 
reveal correlations to social media posts that exhibit specific negative sentiment within 
comments, messages, or user-posted content. It is not guaranteed that one will find 
consistent matches of sentiments; however, it is possible to use machine learning and 
arrive at a probable outcome.  
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After reviewing what has already been done, the problem remains. Extending 
research by Park, You, and Lee (2018), appears to offer new light when integrating 
negative sentiments from fraudulent data and into the context with social media. The 
added value obtained from leveraging legal documents provides useful information in 
identifying threats. For instance, data supporting the research was achieved through 
leveraging top website outlets, such as sites reviewed by PracticaleCommerce (2017), 
and included access to twenty-thousand Twitter tweets. Additionally, court transcripts 
came from several jurisdictions around the country and accounted for approximately 138 
pages from legal documents. 
This dissertation study sought two types of data. First, accessing social input 
tweets from Twitter provided insight into social contexts. Insiders have shared common 
characteristics, and the extraction of these attributes through social media is feasible 
(Gritzalis, Stavrou, Kandias, & Stergiopoulos, 2014). Tweets have varying types of 
content. The following are starting points for capturing content:  
• Date 
• Time 















Second, the need to access court transcripts included a preliminary search for a 
suitable tool and led to the Public Access to Courts Electronic Records (PACER) website. 
PACER provides case information from the eastern District of Virginia, including 
Albemarle, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties (USCourts.gov., 2019). 
Moreover, the Loudoun County General District Court (LCGDC) offered public 
computer access and made cases available. S. Shifflett from the LCGDC office stated that 
the LCGDC database allows researchers the ability to view most filings and then 
determine any required documents (personal communications, August 23, 2019).  
In addition, questions from the prosecuting counsel and the defendant’s replies to 
counsel are intentionally omitted. This dissertation study needed a preview of case 
information to understand what information was available, which required an in-person 
visit to LCGDC, and sought the following preliminary types of information.  
• Prosecutor’s questions 
• Defendant’s responses to questions from prosecuting attorneys  
• Plea agreement(s) 








Social media inputs and court transcripts provide insight into an individual’s 
character. Furthermore, social network data is beneficial for detecting threats at a much 
earlier stage (Kauh et al., 2017); thus, social network data became a factor leveraged in 
this research. Park et al. (2018) found practicality in social media analysis. Albeit, this 
study used contrasting data to find negative emotions in support of discovering insider 
threats, with emphasis placed upon preemployment vetting.  
While the preceding works by Kauh et al.’s (2017) offered promise, attempts to 
prevent an insider threat appeared to leave room for improvement. The research intent 
extends similar works by Park, You, and Lee (2018) in broadening social media 
sentiment analysis to include additional data sources that show relevancy to the Routine 
Activity Theory (RAT). More importantly, fraudulent case data contained lexicons with 
correlations to various forms of fraud are sought after within social inputs. Emphasis was 
placed on early detection, as it is nearly impossible to stop the insider right before the 
incident; hence the best solution is to prevent the threats from occurring through early 
detection (Soh, Yu, Narayanan, Duraisamy, & Chen, 2019).  
This dissertation study used a revised approach and warranted an in-depth 
screening of individuals’ online activities to determine each individual’s level of 
trustworthiness. The idea was to provide another tool to be used in a rounded approach to 




The study’s goal is to explore the various theories (Table 1), show which relates 
to fraudulent cases, examine social media data streams, and examine correlations through 
machine learning of sentiment analysis. Supportive behavioral theories provide another 
mechanism to supplement a well-rounded approach in predicting an insider threat. Just as 
court transcripts offered a wealth of information with specific fraud traits, social media 
content is another instrumental source of data used to assess an individual’s character. 
According to Kandias, Stavrou, Bozovic, and Gritzalis (2013), when employees exhibit 
antisocial and negative views of law enforcement and those in authority, they become 
more likely to act against an organization; traits are becoming increasingly important 
when attempting to identify an insider threat. 
Inputs from social media can fill a gap with applicants not being forthcoming with 
certain information and can potentially decrease their realistic or imagined chances of 
employment (Jeske, Lippke, & Shultz, 2019). Analogous to this study are the efforts 
conducted for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The agency sought a 
contract to build an “extreme” vetting system that would analyze social media posts 




General deterrence theory GDT 
Protection motivation theory  PMT 
Routine activity theory RAT 
Social bond theory SBT 
Theory of planned behavior TRB 




Leveraging social media content is nothing new. Eighty-six percent of employers 
screen prospective employees’ social media content (Berski, 2016), whereas others 
validate information provided on a résumé (Carpenter, 2017). Furthermore, social media 
checks are becoming increasingly important and should be pursued (Kühn & Nieman, 
2017).  
This study focused on the earliest phase of the preemployment vetting process, 
beyond a manual intervention of viewing profiles and résumés. The model for this 
research led to a theoretical framework that included information from social inputs and 
publicly available court transcripts from prosecuted fraud cases.  
The usage of court data, applying theories addressing behavioral norms, and 
social media inputs produced an attainable concept to promote and support a mitigation 
effort. Data supporting the research were available through the court systems and through 
diverse website outlets, such as sites reviewed by Mehra (2017) and access to thousands 
of users in social media.  
Park, You, and Lee (2018) shared a similar purpose with research leveraging 
social inputs to focus on individual behaviors when examined through social content. 
Moreover, changes in behavior or mindset and attitude are often displayed either before 
or during the insider act being committed (Bell, Rogers, & Pearce, 2019). Analyzing 
social inputs presented itself as an effective use of data, provided in-depth insight into 
improving the vetting process, and ultimately allows organizations another tool to help 




This dissertation study formulated the research questions to address whether or 
not the usability of behavioral theories, fraudulent court transcripts, and social media 
inputs could be leveraged as tools used within the preemployment hiring process. The 
following research questions directly correlated to the design science research’s (DSR) 
artifact process, which involves categorizing each question into either a social 
component, a technical component, or both. 
RQ1: Is there sufficient literature on insider threat mitigation strategies? 
(Technical component). 
RQ2: Is there relevance in behavioral theories, court transcripts from fraudulent 
cases, and social inputs that can solve the problem with the research? (Social 
component). 
RQ3: What behavioral theories are most applicable to the research? (Social 
component). 
RQ4: Can IT artifacts be created from the information obtained in behavioral 
theories, from court transcripts of fraudulent cases, and social inputs? 
(Technical component). 
RQ5: Will each IT artifact yield favorable outcomes through lab experiments and 
contribute to the goal of the study? (Technical component) 
Relevance and Significance 
The markets most significantly impacted by insider threats include U.S. banking, 
finance, information technology (IT), healthcare, government, and commercial facilities 
(Williams, Levi, Burnap, & Gundur, 2018). Other likely outcomes beyond a monetary 
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loss include serious harm to the organizations’ confidentiality or integrity (Krull, 2016), 
embarrassment, legal fines, and loss of competitive advantage (Williams et al., 2018), to 
exposure of customer data, trade secrets, or even leaking classified information.  
Two highly documented cases in the intelligence community include Chelsea 
Manning, who was convicted of stealing and disseminating 750,000 pages of documents 
and videos to WikiLeaks (Jarrett & Borger, 2017), and Edward Snowden, the U.S. 
National Security Agency contractor who leaked classified information in 2013 (Kühn & 
Nieman, 2017). In both instances, leaks of classified information presented a significant 
threat to national security.  
There is a belief the problem of insider threats may exist due to a relaxed vetting 
of individuals—such as current or former employees, contractors, or business partners 
(Park, Lim, Kwon, & Choi, 2017)—who act outside the trust expectations that others in 
the organization set (Costa, Albrethsen, & Collins, 2016). The sense of slackened 
onboarding can supply a theoretical significance with the psychological reasoning to 
answer questions centered around human behavior; thus, onboarding is a key aspect in 
threat mitigations.  
Moreover, the RAT states that criminal acts require convergence in space and 
time of likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against 
crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). For example, Williams et al. (2018) provided first-hand 
evidence of the routine activities and guardianship that play a key factor in the likelihood 
of insider threats. Many theories, such as the general deterrence theory and the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB), provide an in-depth understanding of an individual’s intentions 
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with information security compliance practices established by organizations (Flowerday 
& Tuyikeze, 2016).  
Integrating applicable behavioral theories to portions of this research is primarily 
done through the researcher’s interpretations and observations extracted from fraudulent 
case data and court reporting. The observations were taken from supporting documents 
are taken through the researcher’s view and systematically sorting through the data to 
find common themes (Creswell & Miller, 2000), relevant to the research conclusion, and 
becomes a portion of the ending report. The preceding provided another aspect that 
carried significant weight in understanding why insider threats occur and examined the 
context in which the threats operate and shows relevancy to current-day organizational 
threats.   
The study results addressed insider threats at an earlier stage, making it feasible 
for organizational leaders to mitigate attacks through the analysis of social inputs and 
indicate the likelihood of an individual being a potential insider threat (Alahmadi et al., 
2015). Advanced recognition of a threat can become a tool that organizational leaders can 
add to their comprehensive personnel vetting approach. Moreover, an effective defense 
against insider threats is more of a result from a multipronged approach (Catrantzos, 
2018), and not based on a single methodology.  
Additionally, the research findings contribute to the body of knowledge through 
additional analysis of social media content, which demonstrates a conducive direction for 
detecting insider threats from an earlier position, and focused on how supplemental data 
sources can add value to future research. 
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Barriers and Issues 
Several identified barriers and issues are attributed to data collection within the 
context of gathering court transcripts. Although the initial gathering of court transcripts 
came through the PACER system, knowing case numbers became a lengthy process. 
According to USCourts.gov (2019), there are approximately 10,000,000 criminal cases 
and filtering to a specific region can become a daunting task.  
Due to the volume of available data, restrictions needed to be implemented during 
the data collection phase, requires paralegal support, and support from the local 
commonwealth attorneys. If paralegal support and support from the local commonwealth 
attorneys remains an obstacle, legal counsel suggests not working with court transcripts 
due to the volume of information; instead, researchers should use case notes or briefs of 
cases from court reporters to alleviate the previous concerns (B. Gilliam, personal 
communications, September 15, 2019). Court reporters must get permission to release 
transcripts to anyone who is not a party or participant in the case. However, court 
reporters need to get permission to release transcripts to anyone that is not a party or 
participant in the case; it is not to say they cannot or would not (D. Linton, personal 
communications, November 11, 2019) be available. According to Jaafari & Lewis 
(2019), fourteen states have replaced court reporters with technology capable of capturing 
audio and video. 
After the court transcripts became available, additional speech to text conversion 
software such as Bear File Converter, or a similar tool, played a crucial role in converting 
the material. In addition, PDF files later required using iSkySoft to convert into text, and 
later discussed with the lab experiments. The tools identified in the study required 
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sufficient time to understand, which was best fitted for the tasks and capable of 
performing sentiment analysis from various data streams. Some tools require conversions 
of portable document format (PDF) documents into files that are compatible with the 
other tools used within a study; thus, PDF-formatted documents and documents including 
bitmap images create challenges during data extraction (Staar, Dolfi, Auer, & Bekas, 
2018). Nevertheless, issues with document conversions are overcome through a rigorous 
trial-and-error approach. The absence of electronic documents required converting hard 
copies by scanning into a digital format. 
Sufficient time and resources are needed and should be dedicated to the 
preparation, test sampling, cleansing imbalanced data sets, and working to validate the 
efficiency of planned techniques for dealing with the class imbalance problem in big data 
sets (Krawczyk, 2016; Patil & Sonavane, 2017). The significance with imbalanced data is 
voluminous, especially as social media data is growing with ever-increasing needs to 
analyze large amounts of data to get useful insights (Kamburugamuve, Wickramasinghe, 
Ekanayake, & Fox, 2018). 
Furthermore, this research must account for the correction of imbalanced data 
retrieved from social input from Twitter within the lab experiment portion of the DSR 
methodology. In this instance, this dissertation study centered the data update around 
limiting the number of records being processed, which was a constraint among some of 
the study’s tools.  
Lastly, due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19), visiting local jurisdictions often 
required communicating in advance to verify hours of operation, following specific 
protocols when entering office buildings, such as maintaining social distancing, and 
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wearing personal protective equipment. Other means of communicating included 
electronic mail and often required the need to be mindful of the different time zones, 
especially when seeking prompt responses. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
The assumption with the study included the following. Collections of Internet data 
would not become an arduous process. However, collecting data from public Internet 
sites such as Twitter relies on general access from third-party tools, and obtaining access 
presented itself with unique requirements. This dissertation study’s preliminary efforts 
included uncovering the tools or vendors used in the study that currently had APIs to 
support data retrieval. Twitter required a developer’s account and the company must vet 
the application; unfortunately, time ran out while waiting for this process to complete. 
Due to this obstacle, this dissertation study leveraged services through another vendor—
Vicinitas (2020)—to provide Twitter tweets.  
An additional assumption was derived from the unknown amount of groundwork 
that was needed during the gathering of documents. Document conversions can be 
delayed until court transcripts are reviewed in-person. For instance, documents might 
only be available in a printed format and not in the computer-readable format of PDF. 
The required time to convert was an unknown factor, and the level of difficulty was 
outlined in the barriers and issues’ section of this chapter.  
Another area classified as a limitation came from the research using data written 
in English and applied to sentiments, Twitter tweets, and court data. More than 3,600 
interpreters are registered in the judiciary’s National Court Interpreter Database; these 
interpreters cover 180 languages routinely used by the courts (USCourts.gov, 2017). This 
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dissertation study did not want to add another layer of complexity involved in translations 
within the court system. Facebook alone supports 111 diverse languages to its user base, 
with Twitter promoting at least 33 languages (Fick & Dave, 2019). It is possible to 
extend these works towards other languages; however, this was out of this study’s scope.  
An initial assessment of delimitations is established by a finite number of artifacts 
used in the study. Ideally, purposive sampling is used because it is a sample chosen “on 
purpose” because those sampled meet specific criteria (Terrell, 2015) and correlated with 
the number of fraud cases used in the research. Conversely, it was possible to extend the 
delimitations into additional classification types of court cases, and present each artifact 
with varying degrees of uniqueness that goes beyond fraud. 
Definition of Terms 
Big data -  Collection of a very large amount of data (possibly in terabytes or even 
bigger) being generated by numerous users all around the world via different instruments 
and technologies (such as the web). It is difficult for technologies that process small 
amounts of data to handle, process, analyze, capture, and visualize big data (Patil, 
Kamdar, & Khatri, 2014).  
Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes – According to Panda (2018), Discriminative 
Multinomial Naïve Bayes is based on a Naïve Bayes variant with emphasis towards 
characteristics of discriminative learning within text classifications.  
Lexicon - A lexicon is a book containing an alphabetical arrangement of the words in a 
language and their definitions (Merriam-Webster, 2020). 
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Naïve Bayes - Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic based supervised learning algorithm that 
uses Bayes rule together with a strong assumption that the attributes are conditionally 
independent, given the class (Webb, 2010). 
Random forests - Random forests are a combination of tree predictors such that each 
tree depends on the values of a random vector sampled independently and with the same 
distribution for all trees in the forest (Breiman, 2001). 
Support Vector Machine - An SVM is a kind of large-margin classifier: it is a vector 
space based machine learning method where the goal is to find a decision boundary 
between two classes that is maximally far from any point in the training data (Manning, 
Schütze, & Raghavan, 2008).   
Valence Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Reasoner - Valence Aware Dictionary and 
Sentiment Reasoner (VADER) is a parsimonious, rule-based model for sentiment 
analysis of social media text (Hutto & Gilbert, 2014). Within the context of this research, 
VADER’s gold standard list of lexicons provided scoring for words focused on negative 
content directly attributed to tweet sentiment. 
List of Acronyms 
ARFF  Attribute-Relation File Format 
AUP  Acceptable Use Policy 
CSV  Comma-Separated Values 
DMNB Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes 
 
DSR  Design Science Research 
EPA  Electronic Public Access 
FPR  False Positive Rate 
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HR  Human Resources 
IT  Information Technology 
LCGDC Loudoun County General District Court 
OCR  Optical Character Recognition  
PACER Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
PDF  Portable Document Format 
RAT  Routine Activity Theory 
SIEM  Security Information and Event Management 
SVM  Support Vector Machine 
TPB  Theory of Planned Behavior 
TPR  True Positive Rate 
TRA  Theory of Reasoned Action 
WEKA Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis 
VADER Valence Aware Dictionary for Sentiment Reasoning 
Summary 
In summary, Chapter 1 discussed the background of insider threats, the industries 
significantly impacted, and proposed a way forward based on past research. Specifically, 
proposing organizations move from a reactive posture to a proactive stance by examining 
sentiment analysis of social media inputs and court case information relating to fraud. 
The end goal of this study included determining specific threat levels; this process could 
become another tool in an integrated approach to mitigating an insider threat during a 
vetting process. The lengthy and tenuous history with insider threats appears to focus on 
degrees of monitoring and policy enforcement. For instance, monitoring and placing 
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mechanisms that must be observed appears to postpone the inevitable, thus delaying the 
threat. Therefore, prudent security involves more than perfecting the effectiveness of 
technical controls (Ismail & Yusof, 2018).  
Existing works can be extended by integrating sentiment analysis with other 
forms of data and adding social attributes to create value in the vetting of individuals 
through a more aggressive and proactive measure. This dissertation study had three goals 
for conducting this study: (a) to analyze data from new sources to include court cases 
centered around fraudulent activities that is applicable within social media Twitter tweets, 
(b) to provide another vehicle in vetting individuals that go beyond natural language 
processing (NLP) shortcomings with filtering social media posts for dangerous content, 
and (c) to deepen analysis through the merging of relevant data attributed with varying 
degrees of fraud. The bridging of case notes and transcripts into the social realm provided 






Review of Literature 
The literature review in this section covers content that directly supports the 
research with a close look into monitoring shortcomings, problematic rulemaking, policy 
enforcement, and weak vetting practices with onboarding employees. For instance, a 
review of self-disclosures is examined as part of the applicants’ hiring and vetting 
process. Researchers who conducted ancillary literature reviews considered monitoring 
techniques to mitigate an insider threat, but monitoring can become more of a reactive 
and labor-intensive means of taking corrective measures. The weaknesses from previous 
insider mitigation approaches places emphasis to extend similar works to Park et al. 
(2018). This dissertation study’s research is analogous to works from Gritzalis et al. 
(2014), who combined social media data to detect both technical threats and threats 
associated with theory-based behavioral changes.  
This dissertation study selected reviews that addressed existing insider threat 
mitigation efforts. Insider threats are defined as a threat typically attributed to legitimate 
users who maliciously leverage their system privileges and familiarity and proximity to 
their computational environment to compromise valuable information or inflict damages 
(Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, & Upadhyaya, 2005).   
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This dissertation study examined literature directly associated with mitigation 
strategies that provided a more precise understanding of the problem. From a 
foundational point-of-view, Cappelli et al. (2009) suggested that measures that are in 
practice today should include best practices in understanding the threat is organizational-
wide.  
As illustrated within DSR (see Figure 2), the research process incorporated 
theories to paint the picture of the insider threat. Leonard, Cronan, and Kreie (2004) 
hypothesized that behavioral intention is influenced by an individual’s attitude, which in 
turn is influenced by consequences of action and the environment, obligation, and 
personal characteristics. Theory-based contributions within the context of this study 




Figure 2. Research process. Reprinted from “Outline of a design science research 
process,” by P. Offerman, O. Levina, M. Schönherr, and U. Bub, 2009, In Proceedings of 
the 4th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and 
Technology, 1–11. Adapted with permission. 
 
It is crucial to extend relevant works, capitalize on social media sentiment 
analysis (with permission of the author), couple fraudulent case data within the legal 
system, and provide a newer mitigation strategy for insider threats. The following 
sections focus on what is being done in respect with monitoring, profiling, rulemaking, 
policy enforcement, and employee vetting practices, all with their own weaknesses. 
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Monitoring and Profiling 
Monitoring accounts comprise a significant portion of mitigation strategies and 
includes internal network monitoring, external monitoring, and employee monitoring 
(Cole, 2015). However, the price tag associated with continuous monitoring is not 
apparent. Additionally, it is not practical to institute daily monitoring (Cappelli et al., 
2009) without being mindful of required resources.  
Other researchers focused on user profiling with the goal to mitigate insider 
threats by profiling user activities such as capturing keystrokes, monitoring web browser 
activity, files accessed, removable media, and USB activity. Commands such as Change 
Directory (CD), Print Work directory (PWD), List (LS), Copy (CP), and Remove (RM) 
are construed as activities that might be labeled as potentially malevolent (Liu, De Vel, 
Han, Zhang, & Xiang, 2018). Often, logging user activities with deep analysis has offered 
insight into anomalies to address new observations, times of observations, and frequency 
of observations. All known cases exhibit a change in user behavior (Legg, 2015).  
Similarly, Shaw (2006) conducted observation-based profiling and discovered 
through employee profiling, found risk indicators with management labeling workers as 
difficult, and often disgruntled with other employees. A higher percent of those being 
profiled attracted close observations from those in supervisory positions just before 
security incidents. In these instances, identifying the insider threat is flawed when 
factoring in time to process; this became a common theme in Shaw’s research. Mitrou, 
Kandias, Stavrou, and Gritzalis (2014) stated the following in regard to monitoring social 
media:  
Online social media profiles, blogs, tweets, and online fora are increasingly 
monitored by employers searching for information that may provide insight on 
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employees and prospective hires. Taking into consideration the exponentially 
growing participation in online social networking sites and social media, it is not 
surprising that employers are searching for unique information about applicants 
and employees not found with other selection methods. (p. 9) 
Monitoring solutions can become costly; however, monitoring solutions creates a 
barrier and deterrent for many organizations that need to implement an insider threat 
program (Spooner, Silowash, Costa, & Albrethsen, 2018). Organizations may not benefit 
by investing significant amounts of time watching for a collection of events through log 
analysis or through implementing intrusion detection systems. Kauh et al. (2017) 
developed an insider threat model that was capable of inspecting threats within network 
packets, with the long-term research goal of detecting insider threats within a network.  
From a network perspective, thwarting an insider threat leaves more to be desired 
when operating in real-time. Operators must review system attacks without a reference to 
anything that is already on file, often becoming ineffective due to changes in the 
environment (Benferhat, Boudjelida, Tabia, & Drias, 2013), and can lead to undesirable 
results. Similarly, data taken from analyzing security information and event management 
(SIEM) content yields problems with parsing data from security logs, making it difficult 
to design a detection policy for security threats (Lee & Huh, 2019).  
Spooner et al.’s (2018) SIEM study demonstrated capabilities to help mitigate 
insider threats through anomaly detection and provide evidence to support legal actions. 
However, improperly implemented SIEM benefits result in cumbersome and undesired 
tendencies, leading to system issues with log aggregation.  
SIEM solutions often come tethered with many problems, such as inconveniences 
with log management, reporting, real-time monitoring, integration and deployment, 
product quality, and stability (Splunk, 2020). In addition, organizational staff require 
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training, product familiarity, effort, and expertise to implement successfully. An 
exhaustive suite of tools supports insider threat mitigations; however, some out-of-the-
box solutions are somewhat useless and require a significant understanding of the distinct 
intellectual property generated across organizational components (Spooner et al., 2018).  
False-positive alerts should be addressed for SIEM-related technologies to work; 
otherwise, this type of technology could overwhelm analysts, making tasks ineffective 
and inefficient. In contrast, precondition or post condition may be missed due to false 
negatives (Hubballi, & Suryanarayanan, 2014), which is the absence of alerts in the 
presence of attacks (Kenazag, Tayeb, Mahdi, & Aiash, 2016). Moreover, a successful 
implementation requires competent security personnel, with focused efforts to correlate 
rules to drive down response times and work towards minimizing false-positive alerts 
(Vilendečić, Dejanović, & Ćurić, 2017).  
Incorrectly implemented technology places the burden on employees. It is 
unrealistic to expect an individual to pore over voluminous log files on a daily-basis 
(Spooner et al., 2018). The laborious effort to review logs contributes to delays in 
identifying threats, which is not a viable solution in preventing an insider threat. While all 
aspects to monitoring appear as practical approaches, the process of identifying the threat 
is not always real-time; thus, preventive action cannot be taken at the right time (Ambre 
& Shekokar, 2015), leaving the insider threat a lingering concern. 
The literature demonstrates a wide latitude of methodologies, including surveys, 
business cases, machine learning models, sentiment analysis, supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning, theory-based, and a host of others. Several methodologies stood 
out in unexpected ways. For instance, Bell et al. (2019) used a methodology that involves 
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using a survey to provide an in-depth understanding of behavioral indicators. Bell et al. 
found the changes in behavior, mindset, and attitude are often displayed either prior to or 
during the insider act being committed. In contrast, Williams et al. (2018) conducted 
another empirical study and fostered a theory within their survey that correlated with the 
range of crime issues connected to the RAT. Williams et al. posited that theories can be 
applied to insider cyber victimization. 
The issues that result from monitoring practices generate concerns over ethics and 
privacy. Acceptable use policies (AUP) are among the most common company policies 
that outline how employees can use company systems and what employees can expect in 
regard to privacy (Yerby, 2013); however, these policies do not appear to mitigate insider 
threat activities. Providing an acceptable use policy is worthless if the employees do not 
become aware of them (Alshboul & Streff, 2017). Also, without a successful 
implementation, does not change users’ attitudes and behaviors, and makes no impact on 
mitigating insider threats (Gallagher, McMenemy, & Poulter, 2015).  
Although technology cannot solely guarantee a secure environment for 
information, the human aspects of information security should be taken into consideration 
(Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). The importance of addressing the insider threat 
nontechnical component, moved this research towards leveraging social inputs to drive 
the significance through sentiment analysis further.  
Rulemaking and Policies  
Rulemaking can impact the human and technological aspects of monitoring for 
insider threats (Spooner et al., 2018). Linkov, Poinsatte-Jones, Trump, Ganin, and Kepner 
(2019) postulated both over-regulation and under-regulation can be exploited by the 
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insider threat. An optimal solution to rulemaking and policy enforcement could require 
the knowledge to understand the number of rules, instead of measuring the context of 
rules. Rules include exceptions due to higher authority principles (Antoniou, Billington, 
& Maher, 1999); these exceptions often override older regulations and could present an 
unclear direction to employees who rely on voluntary compliance and cooperation 
(Pelton, 2017).  
Other forms of rulemaking are presented as organizational policies and outlined in 
several case studies. Bauer, Bernroider, and Chudzikowski (2017) discovered that many 
organizations have policies specifically addressing internal threats; nevertheless, 
individuals intentionally act noncompliant. Supplemental measures become ineffective 
when responsible personnel violate or override the policies and procedures, irrespective 
of whether this is caused by carelessness, poor knowledge, or clear intention to act 
dishonestly (Nawawi & Salin, 2018).  
Comparatively, Cram, Proudfoot, and D’Arcy (2017) found that organizations 
exhibited a lack of continuity with security policies and demonstrated a lack of cohesion 
with its employees. The most prevalent relationship within Cram et al.’s framework is the 
relationship between enforcement difficulties, excessively complex policies, inadequate 
resourcing, and failure to customize policies. Given the voluminous of inefficiencies in 
successful policy implementations, the rulemaking variant in a deterrence does not appear 
to be a workable solution in preventing the insider threat.  
Employment Vetting 
The prevention of an attack is just as important as other components to 
supplement existing practices; thus, prior researchers have examined various 
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methodologies centered around employment vetting. Current vetting mechanisms are 
slow and less capable of catching new threats (Chen et al., 2015); yet, companies 
continue to rely on these ineffective practices. The vetting of applicants strengthens the 
collective efforts in the overall vetting; however, flaws remain due to the over-reliance on 
information obtained from the employee (Kühn & Nieman, 2017). 
Edward Snowden is a prominent example of flawed employment vetting. 
Snowden was a contractor who leaked classified information in 2013 and sailed through 
multiple security vetting interventions (Kühn & Nieman, 2017). Simpson and Foltz 
(2017) discussed their concern for the lapse of vetting activities between vetting cycles 
and a contributing factor. These weaknesses result in unnoticed recognitions in detecting 
the trustworthiness of individuals. The vetting process’s flaws include the lack of vetting 
the vetting officials, and the tendency for vetting officials to demonstrate a level of bias, 
interject, and intertwine personal experiences within the formal hiring process, thus 
altering vetting outcomes (Lomas, 2019).  
Conversely, employees subjected to polygraphs do not always have questions best 
suited to the position for hire; therefore, security vetting investigators can hinder the 
detection of misconduct (Kühn & Nieman, 2017). Jeske et al. (2019) found that voluntary 
disclosures during preemployment indicate a prospective applicants’ willingness to trust, 
privacy concerns, and perceived a vulnerability associated with the use of information 
about applicants. These indicators may be important predictors of self-disclosure 
involved in information sharing. Even so, the decision to disclose is sometimes forced 
upon the employee with little warning, potentially after the hire, and does not appear to 
solidify sound practices (Hielscher & Waghorn, 2015).  
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Conventional vetting practices that rely on honesty are flawed because employers 
are unable to verify the information or determine which information they should not 
consider in their decision-making process (Jeske & Holland, 2019). It is possible for 
those being interviewed to express some level of undesired personality traits (Roulin & 
Bourdage, 2017). Some traits are classified as misleading and considered a potential 
threat to businesses, which depicts a dark picture of organizations’ ability to deal with the 
threat represented by applicants’ use of deceptive impression management tactics 
(Roulin, 2016).  
Maasberg, Warren, and Beebe (2015) examined insider threats based on 
personality trait profiling during the hiring process. Maasberg et al. aimed to build  
propositions of personalities and factored in negative attitudes, malicious intent, triggers, 
motives, capabilities, and opportunities centered around security weaknesses. Moreover, 
it would appear unmasking the preceding during postemployment, offers even less of a 
solution in mitigating an inside threat.  
Organizational leaders must focus on the prevention of insider threats in the 
earliest stage. BaMaung, McIlhatton, MacDonald, and Beattie (2018) suggested using a 
comprehensive and intrusive approach at the earliest onset.  
Summary 
Previous studies exhibit some level of researched solutions to mitigating insider 
threats; however, all strategies appeared to operate with constant monitoring, act in a 
reactive state, or rely on employees’ honesty. The crux to this research places the 
attention on the human resources (HR) preemployment phase. Preventing potential 
threats should be HR’s central issue of concern (Fischbacher-Smith, 2015), and the 
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practice of social media vetting can afford the employer access to information about the 
candidate that they might not otherwise find (Delarosa, 2015). 
From a prevention point of view, some tools and methodologies examined from 
prior research leave more to be desired. Past studies have considered plans for continuous 
monitoring. Employee monitoring was relatively ineffective for some (Wallace & Loffi, 
2014) because this type of monitoring required security expert knowledge of SIEM rule 
creations. Other studies indicated that employees who do not understand the correct 
balance of security rules within an organization, will not follow the company’s guidance, 
and become the precursor to insider threats. Past mitigation strategies have appeared to 
fall short of genuinely preventing the insider from entering an organization.  
With the advent of social media, there appeared to be a value when analyzing 
content for negative sentiments. Gritzalis et al. (2014) postulated that online content 
could reveal those who have demonstrating traits of an insider threat. Various researched 
approaches from previous studies indicate that sentiment analysis and machine learning 
are likenesses to the research from works by Park et al. (2018). However, the main 
difference between that study and this is based upon identifying negative sentiments that 
directly correlate to fraudulent judicial data extracted from the legal system. Previous 
studies’ inclusion of social media data in efforts to mitigate insider threats provided the 
foundation for the present study. Such information contributed to the relevancy in 









This dissertation study used a design based on DSR to explicitly create IT 
artifacts that had unique attributes to promote preemployment security vetting against 
insider threats. The artifacts included data extracted from prosecuted fraud cases from the 
court system and applied sentiment analysis by combining said data to social inputs, 
primarily tweets. Supportive to data collecting came two different sources of data to (a) 
build negative lexicons from the court documents,  (b) correlate the same negative 
lexicons with social media tweets, (c) perform sentiment analysis within the selected 
tweets, and (d) discover behavior theories applicable within the fraudulent court data; 
discussed in subsequent sections.  
The present study’s methodology was similar to research conducted by Zaib, Asif, 
and Arooj (2019). Zaib et al. focused on word and sentence tokenizing and provided a 
partially based model on implementing tidytext. Zaib et al. used tidytext to collect the 
most negative comments and compare word and sentence analysis to tune their approach. 
Conversely, Silge and Robinson (2017) found that tidytext included functions and data 




Hutto and Gilbert (2014) evaluated thousands of unique lexicons and concluded 
that VADER was a top contender in regard to speed and capability. It is possible to 
leverage existing VADER lexicons through some form of a modified hybrid approach. 
For instance, one can update sentiment lexicons through compiling Waikato Environment 
for Knowledge Analysis’ (WEKA) word lists in a manual process. The manual updating 
of negative lexicons requires updating the polarity scores, editing positive and negative 
indicators, the actual lexicons (Bonta & Janardhan, 2010; see Appendix A), and through 
the usage of custom created scripts. 
Research Methods Employed 
The research approach was based on DSR (Offermann et al., 2009). This 
dissertation study based the IT artifact’s process design on works by De Leoz and Petter 
(2018); this process design is encapsulated within the DSR. 
Step 1 in the initial research process involved conducting the literature review on 
insider threat mitigation strategies. The conducting of literature review had two goals: 
This dissertation study’s goal was to review what has already been done and determine 
the approaches that have and have not worked. Then, focusing on promising works that 
had aspects that were pertinent to the research goal and sought to evaluate (a) social 
inputs as sources of data and (b) court transcripts of cases that dealt with many instances 
of fraud.    
The literature on behavioral theories was applied within specific cases involving 
fraudulent activity, providing insight into other characteristics that are related to threats. 
Empirical studies are more trustworthy when the researcher focuses on specific domains 
of insider threats (Schryen et al., 2016); the behavioral context was crucial to the 
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collected material within the present study. The research process evolved within the 11 
defined steps of DSR, and introduced additional literature to support the research. 
This dissertation study accurately identified the research problem in Step 2 of the 
research process. The research problem was based on what is known from the collected 
literature. The corresponding need to review additional literature can be revisited during 
Step 6 in the DSR process if the problem identification changes.  
Also reviewed, were other input sources such as case summaries, deadlines, 
hearings, docket reports, filers, history documents, parties, related transactions, case 
review of court transcripts, plea agreements, case notes, and available court reporting in 
Step 3 of the DSR. A sufficient number of cases supported each of the created artifacts. 
The evaluation of relevancy was ensured and in alignment with the fraudulent events 
within Step 4 of the DSR. Data that were unrelated to the various forms of fraud were 
dismissed and not included in the study. The design of the IT artifact in Step 5 was a 
crucial research component; however, the design did require additional literature 
research, as identified in Step 6.  
Step 7 proved to be an imperative step with DSR and withing the context of this 
research, allowed modifications of the research questions. For instance, one of the initial 
research questions left an open-ended direction for the study and was later dropped. The 
original DSR utilized a hypothesis refinement for this step; however, this research opted 
to replace the hypothesis refinement with refinement of the research questions.  
During Step 8, various tools provided the processing of data, such as Garner’s 
(1995) WEKA, Jünger and Keyling’s (2013) FacePager, custom-written scripts, and the 
other tools listed in the resource requirement’s section of this study. WEKA was used to 
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analyze content from Twitter, with keyword analysis from extracted data within the court 
transcripts relating to fraud.  
The goal was to conduct as many experiments as needed to conclude with logical 
predictions when ranking the negative lexicons found within fraudulent court data, and 
then use sentiment analysis as an approach to score specific threats (Biswas, 
Mukhopadhyay, & Gupta, 2018). For instance, the totality of negative sentiments (see 
Figure 3) is evaluated by an organization’s limit with scoring insider treat predictions; 
each organization sets their own acceptable scores.   
This dissertation study examined behavioral theories and paired specific theories 
as applicable through observation and interpretation of court documents during Step 9. 
Many behavioral theories came into focus; however, six were notable and one theory 
appeared most prevalent across all lab experiments.  
Implementation of created artifacts requires organizations to access prospective 
new hires’ publicly available social media content. There did not appear to be ethical 
issues in accessing openly available data. Although, Lupton and Michael’s (2017) study 
presented ethical issues, as participants were often highly aware that companies such as 
Facebook and Google track their preferences, habits, and the content they upload to 
social media. 
The output from all tools was delivered in the form of a report that explained the 
findings within the insider threat predictions (see Figure 3). These findings indicated the 
level of threat based on data specifically centered around fraud. The scores represent the 
totality of all negative sentiment scores. An example of the predictions was drawn from 
each respective lab experiment results (-4.77, -10.45, -11.69, -16.06, -13.09, and -12.20). 
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All lab results demonstrated low to excessive content associated with fraud. A logical 
conclusion would include not hiring individuals with scores that exceed an organization’s 
specific threshold.  
 
Figure 3. Insider threat predictions. 
 
In Step 10, this dissertation study provided a method for further research that may 
influence the final step, and presented a summary of the findings in Step 11. All 
advancements within the study significantly supports design science knowledge base and 
becomes a part of the knowledge contribution. Organizational leaders who have a richer 
understanding of insider threats can help mitigate insider threats using a preemptive 
approach. Preemptive approaches can improve preemployment vetting.  
Instrument Development and Validation 
This dissertation study highlighted synopses with instrument development and 
validation with granularity; listed subsequent sections. The study outcome provided 
output to support sentiment analysis research associated with fraud and the ranking of 
social media data. The instrument development and validation supports the development 
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of a tool to improve employee vetting and will help organizations work towards another 
mitigation strategy against the insider threat.   
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Collection of Court Documents 
The aim of this research was to develop an instrument that consists of creating IT 
artifacts from multiple sources of data. The core instruments come from the analysis of 
case data of fraud through a software suite of tools listed in the resource requirement’s 
section of this study.  
This dissertation study examined prosecuted fraud cases to extract negative 
sentiment with the belief that uniqueness of undesirable traits from criminal activities are 
advantageous to the study. Understanding the courts’ search parameters from the legal 
component led to starting the process to gain access to preceding types of documents, 
following two established processes for collecting court documents: (a) created an 
account and completed the application for multi-court exemption from the Judicial 
Conference’s Electronic Public Access (EPA) and (b) submitted the form through regular 
mail delivery or electronically. No charges incur while conducting research once the fee 
waiver is granted; however, nominal transaction charges are incurred if fees are not 
waived. According to PACER (2020), nominal transaction charges are based on the 
following:  
The PACER cost is $0.10 per page with a cap of $3 per document, except 
transcripts. What is the cost for using CM/ECF? There is no additional fee 
associated with the CM/ECF system. Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER) is an electronic public access service that costs $0.10 per page. 
(PACER.gov, 2020, p. 1) 
A valid login and password are required after successful account creation. In 
addition, the client code of “SME” is required, and then used the required credentials to 
log in to USCourts.gov’s PACER system. There was a requirement to register for 
accessing data through the ECF/SMG portal. Although the overall process is effortless, 
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the time required to complete the process necessitated a brief delay and lasted several 
days.  
A selection to the electronic case files and PACER case locator is required, and 
allows logging in. It is critical to choose the appropriate court system; the chosen court 
system should be consistent with the EPA request. This dissertation study used the 
California Northern District Court and The Superior Court of California County of Santa 
Clara to gain public access to electronic court records. Preliminary data for initial queries 
consisted of the following: (a) case numbers, (b) case status (all), (c) file date and last 
entry date (empty), (d) nature of suit, and (e) cause of action (18:1030 computer fraud 
and abuse). The executed query ran after entering the above selections. PACER returned 
a sample listing of cases, and each case could be selected using the case number (see 




PACER Sample Inquiry 
Case number Filed under Dates files Nature of suit 
1001 Acme v. Individual A Filed 01/31/2000 closed 
6/13/2000 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
1002 Smarts v. Individual B Filed 06/16/2000 closed 
12/07/2000 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
1003 Taxi Co. v. Individual C Filed 09/06/2000 closed 
12/07/2000 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
1004 Jobs Inc. v. Individual D Filed 03/19/2001 closed 
10/25/2002 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
1005 Toys Co. v. Individual E Filed 05/16/2002 closed 
05/05/2004 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
1006 Cars Co. v. Individual F Filed 09/13/2002 closed 
12/19/2002 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
1007 Homes Inc. v. Individual 
G 
Filed 03/04/2003 closed 
09/17/2003 
18:1030(18:1030 
Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) 
 
All counsel and parties accessing documents filed with the court are responsible 
for redacting personal identifiers from all downloaded documents (USCourts.Gov, 2019). 
The redaction of personal identification is pursuant to a Local Civil Rule 7(c)(2) and 
Local Criminal Rule 47(c)(2). All extracted data will have data redaction in-place and 
exhibit a level of anonymity to demonstrate compliance.  
Each query is saved into a PDF or comma-separated values (CSV) document 
using a naming convention. The file’s prefix uses the initial data source as its designation. 
For instance, PACER uses “PACER” for all electronic court records, and state and local 
governments used either Santa Clara, Illinois, Albemarle, Fairfax, Loudoun, or Prince 
William county to represent the general district courts. The second designation is the case 
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number followed by a numerical designation to reflect an IT artifact’s association. The  
Bear File converter is used to convert from TEXT or CSV if files are not in the required 
format. The goal is to provide a repeatable document conversion process. In many 
instances, PDF files are opened with iSkySoft and saved into text format. Later, the files 
are loaded into Excel, where the content is sorted and duplicate words are removed. In 
the present study, multiple test cases were saved and the following file name formatting 
was used: “State-CaseID.TXT” (e.g., CA-C123456.txt). In the example given, the 
filename represents case data from California, and the identification assigned by the court 
is C123456. In addition, each filename was unique to each lab experiment.  
Read Court Documents into WEKA 
The first validation process required making the primary data accessible within 
WEKA and validated court case data using WEKA’s explorer option to import the CSV 
(or .XLS) file. Then, saving the file as an attribute-relation file format (ARFF) American 
National Standards Institute compatible file was required. This dissertation study then 
created sentiment analysis by using a classification process based on sentiment weights. 
The initial classification used various algorithms within the lab experiments and a 
filtering mechanism to support supervised learning.  
The initial results yielded a successful validation (see Figure 4); however, the 
process became a component in the pairing with other data used in the research. The 
actual weights were obtained by importing VADER’s negative sentiment lexicons. 
VADER’s lexicons perform exceptionally well in the social media domain (Hutto & 
Gilbert, 2014) and were advantageous to the present study. However, the way VADER 
(see Appendix B) data imports into WEKA, a custom script is used to rewrite each 
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sentiment’s weight; thus, these scripts use the actual weight of each lexicon rather than 
WEKA’s default values of 1.0. The only exception to this logic is to assign WEKA’s 
default weighted values for words that do not exist in the base lexicon word list. The 
value of 0 is assigned in these instances.  
 
 
Figure 4. WEKA preprocessing readable sample data. 
 
Produce Social Media Exports in FacePager 
The second validation process required each social media export to pass through 
preprocessing in Microsoft Excel to (a) eliminate duplicate words using an internal sort 
function and (b) eliminate content deemed not relevant in building a lexicon before 
saving. As part of the preprocessing to ensure all data is readable and capable of being 
interpreted in WEKA, all validations must be met. Similarly, with court cases, an import 
to WEKA is performed through the program’s explorer option. WEKA is expected to 
read the data and produce content (see Figure 4) that could be used in further analysis. 
The other input source came from collecting publicly accessible Twitter tweets 
within FacePager. To accessed this input source required opening the FacePager 
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application and select the “New Database” option. In the “Save As” field, entering the 
database name will represent the source of Internet data (i.e., Twitter-1000), left the 
“Tags” field empty, and changed “Where” to a folder location (i.e., DISS901-3\Twitter). 
On the lower portion of the screen, “Twitter” was selected. Under the same general 
section, required selection of a “Resource” and required that the field was set to 
“/statuses/user_timeline;” this can also be set by clicking on the API image at the top 
portion of the screen. Within the API interface, a requirement of the same Twitter API is 
was applied. Other required settings included (a) adding a setup query string consisting of 
“https://api.twitter.com/1.1” into the base path, (b) setting the resource to 
“/statuses/user_timeline,” setting the parameters to “user_id and references <Object 
ID>,” and setting the maximum pages to 1000. Under settings, ensured “Select All 
Nodes” was selected, that “Maximum Errors” was set to 99, and that “Log All Requests” 
was checked. Using the custom table columns window, adding a new key called “text” 
and applied to the “Apply Column Setup” saved the setting. The “text” showed within the 
upper objects and query window. 
Next, each value (see Figure 5) was deleted in the access token and access token 
secret and required secure consumer keys (see Figure 6) from the Twitter developer’s 
account and access was granted after Twitter vetted the application. The access settings 
were applied to the consumer keys (see Figure 7) within the “Authentication Settings” 
window. To set the access token and access token secret, required logging into Twitter 
and selecting “Add Node” on the upper part of the screen. This dissertation study used 
Calculator.net’s (2020) random number generator to create a comprehensive list of 
numbers from a lower limit of 1067092933653692416 and an upper limit of 
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1267092933653692415 and generated 20,000 unique numbers, and then sorted the 
numbers in ascending order. The long integers corresponded to possible Twitter IDs. 




Figure 5. FacePager access token. 
 
 






Figure 7. Authentication settings. 
 
Next, content was copied and pasted from the Notepad into the “Add Node” box. 
Under “Settings,” select both “All Nodes” and the “Fetch Data” options are selected. 
Next, highlight any object type labeled “Data” within the upper leftmost box and verify 
that the rightmost box had Tweets in the Key (text) field’s value. Once multiple data 
fields showed meaningful data, all Tweets are exported by selecting all results and using 
use the “Export Data” option. Content was saved within the root folder under 
C:\ Research Twitter Tweets\TwitterData.csv. 
 Later, the dissertation study used Vicinitas’ (2020) services to query Twitter 
feeds for March 2019; this query included 20,000 random tweets. Data were provided in 
an Excel worksheet, and only the text of the Tweets was saved to a similar file, such as 
C:\Research \Tweets \Vicinitas\Tweets\TwitterData.csv. Additionally, the data was saved 
as an Excel file from the .xlsx format to the .xls for compatibility with WEKA’s Excel 
converter 1.0.7. This dissertation study used data from Vicinitas because of the quickest 
data availability. Both FacePager or Vicinitas processes works, but the latter is 
considered the most productive; providing faster overall processing.   
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Import Social Media into WEKA 
The preceding section detailed how to move data into WEKA as part of the 
validation process; the same methodology must be applied to the FacePager data. The 
validation of FacePager data remains consistently the same, aside from differences in 
data attributes. A decision was made to save imported social media data to an ARFF 
compatible file (see Appendix C). Similar to court case data, there was a need to create 
sentiment analysis using the same word classifications. This dissertation study initially 
used Naïve Bayes for word classification. Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic method that has 
high accuracy and performance in text classification (Sari, Kurniawati, Prayitno, & 
Irfangi, 2019) with a probabilistic classifier for the normal distribution to model numeric 
attributes (Amin & Habib, 2015). However, manually traversing the classifications within 
WEKA led to an extensive delay while testing various classifications. Ultimately, using 
Auto-WEKA provided an easier initial approach, especially when dealing with large 
datasets, repetitive classification testing and knowing how to choose among the dozens of 
machine learning procedures implemented in WEKA and each procedure’s 
hyperparameter settings to achieve good performance (Kotthoff, Thornton, Hoos, Hutter, 
& Leyton-Brown, 2017). Because of Auto-WEKA’s ability to select the best 
classification, efforts later ran manual classifications comparisons against Auto-WEKA, 
and used Trees Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and DMNB. The results yielded successful 




Perform Sentiment Analysis 
Sentiment analysis was needed to best understand the existence of fraud within 
the context of social media and performed in WEKA through importing and pairing each 
court case involving fraud with one social media input as ARFF compatible file, and then 
applied WEKA’s Auto-WEKA document classification (see Appendix D) to select the 
best algorithm; the best algorithm is typically Trees Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, or 
DMNB. This dissertation study leveraged further filtering and analysis by using the 
WEKA package AffectiveTweets. The importance of using AffectiveTweets is centered 
around the package’s ability to analyze tweets. According to Branz and Brockmann 
(2018), AffectiveTweets provides many capabilities and notable filtering to demonstrate 
negative sentiment with emphasis to anger, disgust, fear; all of which is based on 
sentiment lexicon scoring. In additions, AffectiveTweets can analyze social media 
sentiment and is key in the distant supervision method for models using unlabeled tweets 
(Bravo-Marquez, Frank, Pfahringer, & Mohammad, 2019), which was a critical element 
within this study. 
Technological Aspects 
The technological aspects of this study were purely driven by the tools used 
within the study and the ease of data collections in leveraging Internet data. Specifically, 
the use of the Internet played an instrumental role in the research. The Internet created the 
method to reach into the court systems, and more importantly, social inputs. Both 
endpoints provided a deeper understanding of common sentiments extracted from 
fraudulent cases and helped to potentially identify insider threats.  
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Behavioral Theory-Based Aspects 
The social component of behavioral theories played an essential role in 
understanding the sentiment analysis’ outcome. An abundant number of behavioral 
theories represent individuals’ mindsets and explains individuals’ pathway to becoming a 
threat. Social and internal mechanisms play a critical role in a person’s mind, as these 
mechanisms silence one’s urge to follow moral obligation when people act illegally (Shi, 
Booth, & Simon, 2017). Various behavioral theories were examined and became an 
integral component of the study.  
Sample Data 
This dissertation study obtained sample data from two key sources: (a) court 
documentation from The Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara, The 
Northern District of California San Francisco Division, The United States District Court 
Northern District of Illinois, and The United States District Court Southern District of 
California and (b) publicly available Twitter tweets.   
The research followed the data analysis as referenced in the GPFLE section for 
consistency and ensured all processed data could be read through various programs. 
Initially, all court data was scrubbed for blank records, duplicates, and other evidence of 
insufficient data. In some other cases, data was not able to be read until installing OCR 
plug-ins. A series of custom scripts and programs corrected formatting issues and saved 
into a format compatible with WEKA. The collection of Twitter tweets included 
information requiring redaction. In these instances, user id, user screen name, bio, 




Through additional scripts came the resulting ARFF compatible files used by 
WEKA in the analysis and tweet classifications. Outside of WEKA's purview left the 
behavioral theory interpretations, which augmented the study's classification and 
analysis. The subsequent data analysis, the GPFLE process, and lab experiments provide 
a closer look into the lab experiments' data interactions. 
Data Analysis 
Sentiment analysis may be one of the best tools for making predictions within 
social media content. Within the context of this study, sentimental analysis was 
applicable and built on lexicon data from fraudulent cases. Building dictionaries for each 
word’s contextual characteristics—such as its order in the text, part of speech, 
cooccurrence with other words, and other contextual characteristics specific to the text in 
which the word appears—is essential (Shapiro, Sudhof, & Wilson, 2018). 
A host of tools to predict insider threats were readily available. For instance, this 
dissertation study used each respective set of files within WEKA to perform sentiment 
analysis using each dictionary and each crawl of social media with FacePager. The 
dissertation study’s goal was to rank sentiments associated with fraud, yet conform to a 
lexicon-based negative social media sentiment, as Hutto and Gilbert (2014) demonstrated 
in their multiple-domain model. The lexicon construction’s foundation included using 
cases of fraud, social media inputs, and news articles, which presented a wide latitude of 
sentiments and were used throughout all lab experiments. 
Sufficient literature on insider mitigation strategies exists; however, other avenues 
must be traversed, which provided a starting point for this study. An attempt was made to 
(a) use the baseline of negative sentiment lexicons, (b) examine criminal cases of fraud, 
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(c) determine similarities, (d) traverse Twitter tweets in an attempt to find Tweets that 
shared commonalities, (e) perform sentiment analysis, and (f) correlate common themes 
of behavioral theories to the outcome.  
The dissertation study’s data analysis provided insight into the correlation of 
lexicon data, increased understandings of social inputs through machine learning,  
promoted IT artifact creations and usage, and used Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) lexicons to 
analyze custom scripts and WEKA’s AffectiveTweets package to examine all sources of 
court data to produce a summary of results.  
Formats for Presenting Results 
The dissertation study intended to examine social inputs coming from fraudulent-
related activities and use sentiment analysis as one of its core tools. The results provided 
a better understanding of insider threat mitigation, as examined within employee vetting. 
Supplemental results revealed annotations from insider threat rankings and social-
behavioral theories to support the findings.  
This study’s results came through outputs of classifications, IT artifact 
correlations of sentiment from social inputs, and insider threat lexicons from fraud. The 
output from DSR provided contributions to solution and problem-domain maturities by 
supportive means to adaptations and provide a pathway of improvements within the 
scope of insider threat mitigations. The presented results include charts, figures, tables, 
and other visual means to describe the findings, with supplemental information in the 




Due to the nature of the research with leveraging content from social media, 
institutional review board approval was not required because the investigation did not 
directly interface with people. The information collected was publicly available from 
social media websites, and the content is retrieved through no special means aside from 
using tools designed to collect data. This dissertation study was granted a Twitter 
developer’s account and passed Twitter’s vetting process. In addition to social media 
data, requests for court-filed insider threat case information directly related to fraud 
within Albemarle, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William County general district courts 
was initiated. This dissertation study’s preliminary requests for information indicated that 
it is possible to obtain this information using only a case number and, in some instances, 
a nominal fee for court transcripts. Online information is available to the public without 
any special access; however, court documents fall under the Freedom of Information Act. 
This dissertation study used the following hardware and software within this 
study. Aside from Internet connections, all hardware and software are considered 
operating within one physical location. Both Microsoft Windows 10 (1909) and Apple 
macOS High Sierra 10.13.6 operating systems provided the base for which all research 
tools operated and detailed in the following section.  
Research Tools 
WEKA 
WEKA is used as an input and output tool that reads inputs from social media 
imported Excel data, provides output with both sentiment analysis, and uses classification 
output and sentiment filtering. In addition, WEKA uses a common file format to store its 
51 
 
data sets, thus presenting the user with a consistent view of the data regardless of what 
machine learning scheme may be used (Garner, 1995). 
FacePager 
FacePager is used for fetching publicly available data from YouTube, Twitter, 
and other websites based on APIs and web scraping. All data are stored in an SQLite 
database and may be exported to CSV (GitHub.com, 2020). FacePager was used to test 
fetching Twitter data during the pre-research phase. This process provided insight into 
methods used later within the study. 
Auto-WEKA 
Auto-WEKA makes it easy for non-experts to find the best classification 
algorithm within WEKA along with a good hyper-parameter configuration for a given 
application scenario, with little human time and within a reasonable amount of fully 
automated computation (Thornton, Hutter, Hoos, & Leyton-Brown, 2012). The 
classification algorithm selection process necessitated very little input. However, this 
study leveraged the WEKA generic object editor to set optional parameters within the 
Auto-WEKA classification selection process.   
Auto-WEKA’s classification parameters are as follows: batch size (100) debug 
(false), check capabilities (false), memory limit (8192), metric to optimize (error rate), 
best configs (1), decimal places (2), parallel runs (1), seed (123), and time limit (60). The 
only settings changed for the lab experiments are memory and time limit. Each respective 
default values of the two settings were 1024 and 15 (see Appendix D, Figure D5).   
The Auto-WEKA package uses an input tool to analyze data, determines the 
optimal classification algorithm, and apply the algorithm to data. The process to achieve 
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the optimal algorithm is driven by the data being ingested. According to Kotthoff, 
Thornton, Hoos, Hutter, and Leyton-Brown (2017), not every classifier will apply to 
every dataset. The primary reason is due to the classification process’s ineffectiveness in 
handling missing data and applies a subset of classifiers within the optimal solution. 
Examples of the different classifiers are outlined within the lab experiments, with Auto-
WEKA selecting either Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, or DMNB. However, Random 
Tree, Lazy IBk, and SVM were also evaluated.  
AffectiveTweets 
AffectiveTweets is implemented as a package for WEKA machine-learning 
workbench and provides methods for calculating state-of-art affect analysis features from 
tweets (Bravo-Marquez et al., 2019). This dissertation study used AffectiveTweets to 
analyze social media content and produce output in determining sentiment scores; 
detailed within the lab experiments. 
WEKAExcel 
WEKAExcel is used to import Excel files into WEKA. Once successful imports 
occur, WEKA can save data in a standard file format that becomes usable to any 
machine-learning scheme.  
Java 
Java 8u261 is a requirement for the WEKA version used in the research. 
Visual Studio 
Visual Studio 2019 v16.8.4 was used to create custom code (see Appendix E, F, 




Office 365 was used to produce research reports. 
Google Scholar 
Google Scholar was used to collect research content separate from Nova 
Southeastern University’s library. 
PACER 
The PACER system has brought the citizens ever closer to the courthouse. Public 
access to court documents is faster, better, and cheaper than at any prior time in U.S. 
history (Martin, 2008). PACER is a useful input tool in requesting court data.  
iSkySoft Editor 
iSkySoft editor was used to read input PDF court data and to create exportable 
files used by custom scripts within the study.  
NSU Library 
The Nova Southeastern Library was instrumental in the collection of literature. In 
many instances, literature did not exist without paying for subscriptions to many of the 
top journals.  
FiOS Internet 
FiOS Internet provided communications to allow the research to take place. 
Summary  
The methodology overview detailed the 11 steps of DSR, including creating the 
IT artifacts and ranking the sentiment analysis of multisource data by analyzing each 
collected data set. Each data set represented a single IT artifact. In addition to the social 
and fraud inputs, behavioral theories contributed towards a holistic representation of each 
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IT artifact. This chapter outlined a listing of required resources that were needed to 
support data collections, analysis, and suggested sampling. The instrument development 
and validation process provided a glimpse into pairing data, performing sentiment 








All lab experiments correlated to the creation of each IT artifact and provided a 
way to rank fraudulent case data in the sentiment of Twitter content. The data analysis 
revealed the attributes associated with insider threats and identified various machine-
learning algorithms that can be used to leverage inputs from court documents on fraud. 
The data provided ample content to construct the subsequent IT artifacts and pairing of 
each artifact with the negative VADER sentiments. Similarly, the study’s uniqueness 
included specific VADER’s negative sentiments that were extracted from court 
proceedings (see Appendix J) and deemed relatable to criminal activities.  
Initially, this dissertation study planned to use Naïve Bayes as the primary 
classifier; however, the discovery of Auto-WEKA and manual WEKA, appeared to be 
more beneficial than any specific algorithm. For instance, Auto-WEKA supports an 
intelligent algorithm selection that is beyond other manual selecting of classifications 
within WEKA. Auto-WEKA supports the selection of 30 classifications by automatically 
reviewing performance generalizations and applies model optimizations previously 
believed to be only a manual process (Kotthoff, Thornton, & Hutter, 2017).  
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The output from each experiment is carefully examined in the subsequent 
sections, with emphasis placed upon each unique court case. Additionally, the processes 
included discoveries with negative sentiments found within social inputs, specifically 
within Tweets. Each IT artifact is traceable to a specific case of fraud, and relations to 
negative sentiments are uncovered within tweets. The analysis coincides with many of 
the referenced behavioral theories to illustrate the social aspect of the IT artifact.  
General Procedures for Lab Experiments (GPFLE) 
All lab experiments required three data sources: (a) court documentation retrieved 
through USCourts.gov’s website, (b) negative social media sentiment, and (c) Twitter 
tweets. The uniqueness of each artifact was established through individually collected 
court data. All other data collections were replicated through each experiment to include 
over 7,000 of Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) negative sentiment lexicons and 20,000 Twitter 
tweets from 2019. For ease of repetition, the experiments referenced GPFLE as a starting 
point.  
The sequential effort began with collecting data from the courts. This process 
required the study to convert the source PDF files into text by using the iSkySoft 
document converter. Next, saving the output file (e.g., CA-C1903821.txt) into a text file 
with each line within the file representing each word in the referenced case number. A 
few instances did require using the optical character recognition (OCR) plug-in. In 
addition, this dissertation study created a custom program called PDF-Text-
ToProcessedText (see Appendix I) to read each line of the converted text file and write a 
new file that included corrections for formatting. Other processing included importing the 
text file to Microsoft Excel, sorted and removed duplicate words by ensuring the 
57 
 
data/sorting advanced unique records was the only option selected, saved the Excel file 
back into the text file, and saved the text file into the .xls format to support compatibility 
with WEKA’s Excel converter 1.0.7. Additional preparations required launching WEKA 
from a command prompt within the c:\program files\WEKA\subdirectory, and then 
invoking the “Java -Xmx8192m -jar WEKA.jar” command. Failure to change the 
application’s access to additional heap memory led to heap errors, errors when 
marshaling XML response, and unanticipated program termination. A later discovery 
narrowed down the preceding problem with Auto-WEKA and using the graphical user 
interface on the Apple OSX. Because of the issue, launching WEKA from the command 
line as annotated above, was the only course of action in allowing the automatic 
classification process to continue.  
The collection of Twitter data was received as an Excel file and then saved to a 
CSV file. The last of the initial parallel effort concluded with converting Hutto and 
Gilbert’s (2014) social media VADER sentiment lexicons into a readable format for later 
processing. The dissertation study accomplished the preceding by using a custom 
program to pair negative sentiments within the court data. 
The dissertation study developed a sequence of short programs to stage and test 
the data. The assignment of weights to court lexicons (see Appendix E) program reads 
the text files, creates a new output file with the content from the input, and paired with 
associate sentiment weight from Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) sentiment weights. The 
output is read into WEKA, along with Twitter data, and sentiment analysis is performed. 
Converting Twitter tweets into fixed words (see Appendix F) was accomplished by 
reading the 20,000 tweets from the master CSV file and convert into plain text. Two 
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sequencers (see Appendix G and H) first read each line from court documents and looks 
up occurrences within the matching file. If a match is found, the output is written as a hit; 
with matching lexicon and weight (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If a match is not found, the output 
is written to the same file with a neutral zero weight. The second sequencer reads each 
line from the hits file and locates possible hits in the Twitter file. If matching tweets exist, 
record the lexicon and number of times found (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If a match is not found, 
the output is written to the same file using a zero weight as 0.0. Because iSkysoft created 
an unformatted layout, the last program converted iSkysoft’s output into formatted text 
(see Appendix I).   
Using the previously created “hits” file as an input, examining the Tweets for 
words that existed in the “hits” file and recorded the word and total occurrences within 
the Tweets was needed. Next, the final output file was saved as “Found-In-Social-
Media.” The file was later used by Excel and prepared by the following steps: 
• Opened the “Found-In-Social-Media” file using Excel.  
• Used the Excel Import Wizard to select “Delimited with Tabs”  
• Reviewed the data in the lower portion of the window, then clicked 
“Next” followed by “Finished” 
• Saved with “Save-as CSV” (MS-DOS; *.csv) 
After the programs produced the initial data captures, this dissertation study used 
WEKA to load the “Found-In-Social-Media.csv” file by opening and then saving the 
CSV fie to an ARFF file. Works by Bravo-Marquez et al. (2019) led to the use of 
AffectiveTweets text classification 1.0.2 filter for analyzing the sentiments of Tweets. 
The package supporting the WEKA/filters/supervised/attribute and made was installed to 
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support Tweet selections, and used the preprocess tab under attributes to create the 
statistics for 28 attributes.  
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required examining relevant 
behavioral theories that applied to the court-collected data. The dissertation study’s 
understanding of the context of the events leading up to the fraud warranted an 
examination of the behavioral aspects that contributed to the study’s conclusion.  
Lab Experiment 1: Artifact 1 
The artifact ID identified by the first lab experiment was SC-1903821. In this 
instance, Santa Clara, California provided data from a fraud case that was estimated at 
$500,000 in losses to a local business. The following steps were executed to create the 
artifact, apply both court and reporting notes, and connect to a specific behavioral theory. 
This dissertation study followed the GPFLE process for Lab Experiment 1 and 
supplemented the process with the following activities: determine artifact scores, tweet 
negative emotion scores, optimal classification, and artifact negative summary. 
WEKA became an instrumental tool of the study, and within the process tab, 
provided various scores (see Table 3) for 27 attributes. The attributes included values 
derived from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” 
“TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and “TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” 
filters. The Artifact 1 detailed scores can be found in Table 3. The most prominent Tweet 
negative emotion (see Appendix K) scores (see Figure 8) are the four listed within the 




Artifact 1 Detailed Scores 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
Sentiment weight -2.5 2.4 .986 .911 




0 .485 .008 .063 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
posScore 
0 .573 .069 .187 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
negScore 
-1.244 0 -.268 .183 
NRC-10-Anger 0 1 .017 .13 
NRC-10-Trust 0 1 .143 .351 
NRC-10-Negative 0 1 .023 .15 
NRC-10-Positive 0 1 .253 .441 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anger 
0 .037 .004 .011 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anticipation 
0 .079 .009 .023 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Disgust 
0 .01 .001 .003 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Fear 
0 .01 .001 .003 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Joy 
0 .094 .009 .028 
NRC-10-Sadness 0 .016 .002 .005 
NRC-10-Surprise 0 .037 .004 .011 





Table 3  
Artifact 1 Detailed Scores (continued) 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Negative 
0 .106 .01 .031 
NRC-10-Expanded 
Positive 
0 .121 .012 .036 
SentiWordnet-
posScore 
0 .354 .082 .124 
SentiWordnet-
negScore 
-.344 0 -.115 .109 
Mpqa-posCount 0 1 .36 .481 
Mpqa-negCount 0 1 .17 .13 
BingLiu-negCount 0 1 .17 .13 
AFINN-posScore 0 2 .623 .875 
AFINN-negScore -3 0 -.051 .344 
S140-posScore 0 .27 .172 .06 
S140-negscore -.18 0 -.003 .023 
 
 






Figure 9. Artifact 1 negative summary.  
 
The Naïve Bayes classification was initially thought to be the preferred classifier 
within all lab experiments; however, after manually testing various classifiers, the Trees 
Random Forest  classification algorithm was selected and then applied against court data 
(see Figure 10). Although the algorithm provided comparable accuracy over some of the 
other classifiers within this lab experiment, not all experiments produced similar results; 
in this instance, Trees Random Forest (see Appendix L) yielded a conducive Kappa score 
(see Appendix M) of 0.8055.
 
Figure 10. Artifact 1 Trees Random Forest classification.  
63 
 
The following section evaluates the outcome from the classification process and 
delves deeper into the True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), and the 
Precision. First, according to Azar, Elshazly, Hassanien, and Elkorany (2014), the True 
Positive Rate (TPR) is representative of positive classes correctly classified by a model is 
achieved. Second, the False Positive Rate (FPR) represents the fraction of negative 
classes that are identified as positive. And third, the Precision is the exactness of a 
classifier (Kaur & Saini, 2015), and ideally having a higher precision closer to 1.0 
correlates to fewer false positives.  
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.873 
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s 
weighted average scored a 0.039; acceptable and low. The non-weighted average for the 
Precision was manually calculated at an average of 0.539 and appears comparable to 
other experiments, though lower than expected.  
Although this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values, this 
was likely due to a sparse data capture. Instances of zero-valued classes accounted for 
two negative lexicons; complaint and felony. Class values greater than zero and less than 
one accounted for two lexicons; active and parties are not listed with negativity. And the 
last class with values equal to one accounted for three lexicons bold, justice, and number; 
not appearing in negative lexicon listings (see Appendix Q). Furthermore, this 
experiment’s classification of zero-valued TPR classes could be identifiers with lexicons 
associated with fraud.   
The recall is defined as the number of relevant items retrieved as a proportion of 
all the relevant items that might potentially be retrieved (Walters, 2016) and in the 
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instance from this experiment, two classifications with two lexicons yielded no recall. 
While the F-Measure effectively references the TP to the arithmetic mean of predicted 
positives and real positives, being a constructed rate normalized in an idealized value 
(Powers, 2020), several instances was undefined and is believed to be due zero TP values 
within the limited data capture.  
Other classification details include the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC). 
The MCC is a more reliable statistical rate which produces a high score only if the 
prediction obtained good results (Chicco  & Jurman, 2020). As with the Precision, Recall, 
and F-Measure, the best explanation for MCC’s unknown values is likely due to the 
comparatively small size of both positive and negative records within the data. When '?' 
symbols appear in the output, the specific class may have not enough samples or none of 
the samples can be assigned to the class (Stackoverflow, 2021). With the increase in data 
within subsequent experiments, it is postulated the numbers will not remain undefined. 
Lastly, the examination of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), a plot of the true 
positive rate against the false-positive rate at various threshold settings (Egieyeh, Syce, 
Malan, & Christoffels, 2018) had a weighted average of 0.962. According to Fan, 
Upadhye, and Worster (2006), general interpretation of the value is high discriminatory, 
yet anything higher and closer to 1.0 is very rare. Interestingly, the following 
experiments’ volume of data significantly increases, and class accuracies are further 
examined with the expectancy to help postulate cohesions shared within all experiments.  
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required the examination of 




Over the course of his 30 years in the coaching profession, the defendant had the 
opportunity to train, develop, and establish swimmers and programs throughout 
the United States. He came to SCSC in September of 1995 as the Associate Head 
Coach, under Dick Jochums. Working with Jochums, SCSC went on to win two 
National titles for men and one national title combined. Following the retirement 
of Jochums in December of 2006, the defendant was elevated to the position of 
Head Coach of Santa Clara Swim Club. In that position, the club saw tremendous 
growth in terms of both performance and number of swimmers and programs 
offered to the swimming community. In September of 2009, the defendant was 
also given the title of CEO of the organization. (p. 1) 
The turn of unfortunate events shared by D’Addona aligns with the RAT. In this 
instance, the offender leveraged his tenure and promotions through the ranks to place 
himself in a position with access to financial components within the organization. 
According to Cohen & Felson’s (1979), definition of RAT, the circumstances 
surrounding the embezzlement was demonstrated through the lack of capable guardians 
against criminal activities, and the offender sought suitable targets; all in alignment with 
the theory. 
In summary, the data from the fraudulent case SC-1903821 demonstrated the 
lowest below zero AFINN-negScore (see Appendix K) value of -3 when evaluating 90 
hits from comparing court case lexicons from the case and Twitter tweets having like 
sentiments. In the same analysis, the AffectiveTweets collected the negative 
SentiWordnet, resulting in the automatic annotation of all the synsets of WordNet with 
notations of “positivity,” “negativity,” and “neutrality” (Baccianella, Esuli, & Sebastiani, 
2010). In these instances, the tweet’s focus was placed upon negativity of -0.344, 
signifying a minor threat. In comparison, the AFINN score yielded -3 and represented 
words with a score that ran between -5 and 5, with negative scores indicating negative 
sentiment and positive scores indicating positive sentiment (Silge & Robinson, 2020). 
Moreover, the NRC attributes were derived from word-level emotion association lexicon 
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for about 14,200 word types (Mohammad & Turney, 2013), which produced the lowest 
recording with a HASH-SENT-negScore of -1.244.  
Additionally, the identified behavioral theory added value when joined as part of 
a comprehensive approach through the experiments. The outcome produced a common 
theme shareable throughout the research, which allowed identifying areas of weakness in 
a collective effort to detect the insider threat.  
Lab Experiment 2: Artifact 2 
The second lab experiment was identified by artifact ID 320-CR-00266. Unlike 
the first experiment, a significant increase of court data was included. The United States 
District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division provided data 
from a case with 23 counts to scheme, artifice to defraud investors, and estimated in the 
millions of dollars. According to Anderson (2020), the case involved engagement in 
illegal activities relating to false financial statements, abetting, bank fraud, and wire 
transfer fraud. 
The following steps were executed to create the artifact, apply both court and 
reporting notes, and connect to a specific behavioral theory. The distinguishing and 
contrasting attributes beyond the first experiment came through additional data. Lab 
Experiment 2 offered a 5-fold data increase. This dissertation study followed the GPFLE 
process for Lab Experiment 2 and supplemented with the following activities: determine 
artifact scores, tweet negative emotion scores, optimal classification, and artifact negative 
summary. The detailed scores for Artifact 2 can be found in Table 4.  
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Table 4  
Artifact 2 Detailed Scores 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
Sentiment weight -2.8 1.8 .247 1.006 




0 .394 .033 .104 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
posScore 
0 1.066 .098 .227 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
negScore 
-4.99 0 -.229 .51 
NRC-10-Anger 0 1 .096 .295 
NRC-10-Trust 0 1 .201 .402 
NRC-10-Negative 0 1 .096 .295 
NRC-10-Positive 0 1 .21 .408 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anger 
0 .033 .004 .008 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anticipation 
0 .198 .014 .034 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Disgust 
0 .007 .001 .002 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Fear 
0 .021 .004 .008 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Joy 
0 .112 .013 .027 
NRC-10-Sadness 0 1 .044 .205 
NRC-10-Surprise 0 0 0 0 
NRC-10-Trust  0 1 .201 .402 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Negative 
0 1 .096 .295 
NRC-10-Expanded 
Positive 
0 1 .21 .408 
SentiWordnet-
posScore 
0 .175 .01 .027 
SentiWordnet-
negScore 
-.291 0 -.083 .08 
Mpqa-posCount 0 1 .004 .066 
Mpqa-negCount 0 1 .105 .307 
BingLiu-negCount 0 1 .105 .307 
AFINN-posScore 0 2 .672 .489 
 AFINN-negScore -1.174 0 -.328 .923 
 S140-posScore 0 .927 .279 .291 
 S140-negScore -.18 0 -.085 .274 
 
 
As in the previous experiment, WEKA continued to be an instrumental tool for 
the study. The process tab provided various statistics for 27 attributes. The study used the 
preprocess tab and created statistics for 27 attributes (see Table 4). The attributes 
included values derived from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” 
“TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and 
“TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” filters. The most prominent tweet negative 
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emotion (see Figure 11) scores are the four listed within the negative summary (see 
Appendix K), and the same presented in an alternate view (see Figure 12).  
Like Experiment 1, the study initially thought Naïve Bayes was the preferred 
classifier within all lab experiments. However, after testing various classifiers, the study 
selected the Trees Random Forest classification algorithm and applied this algorithm 
against court data (see Figure 13), which provided a slightly lower score when compared 
to the previous experiment, yet not a substantially lower percentage.   
 
 















Figure 13. Artifact 2 Trees Random Forest classification.  
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Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.850 
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s 
weighted average scored a 0.009; exceptionally low. The non-weighted average for the 
Precision was manually calculated at an average of 0.999 and appears considerably 
higher than experiment one.  
Although this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values, this is 
best explained by the class not having enough samples. Instances of zero-valued classes 
accounted for two negative lexicons; liability and fraud. Class values greater than zero 
and less than one accounted for no negative lexicons. And the last class with values equal 
to one accounted for two lexicons limited, and hide; appearing in negative lexicon listings 
(see Appendix R). Furthermore, this experiment’s classification of both zero-valued and 
one-valued TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons associated with fraud.     
The recall is defined as the number of relevant items retrieved as a proportion of 
all the relevant items that might potentially be retrieved (Walters, 2016) and in the 
instance from this experiment, two classifications with two lexicons yielded no recall. 
While the F-Measure effectively references the TP to the arithmetic mean of predicted 
positives and real positives, being a constructed rate normalized in an idealized value 
(Powers, 2020), with several instances undefined and was believed to be due zero TP 
values within the limited data capture.  
As in the preceding experiment, other classification details include MCC and F-
Measure. Comparing to the previous experiment, the best explanation for MCC’s 
unknown values was likely due to the comparatively small size of both positive and 
negative records within the data. With the increase in data within subsequent experiments 
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three through six, again it is postulated the numbers will not always remain as undefined. 
Lastly, the examination of the ROC had a weighted average of 0.940. Fan, Upadhye, and 
Worster’s (2006) general interpretation of the value is high discriminatory, and again; 
anything higher and closer to 1.0 is very rare. Interestingly, the following experiments’ 
volume of data significantly increases, and class accuracies are further examined with the 
expectancy to help postulate cohesions shared within all experiments. 
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required the examination of 
relevant behavioral theories as applied to the court collected data. The following excerpt 
provides an in-depth description on the case and Justice.gov (2020) stated the following:  
The complaint and information, the defendant, 36, of San Francisco, California, is 
alleged to have orchestrated multiple schemes to defraud his victims. The 
defendant founded a venture capital company that he used between 2013 and 
2016 to raise and manage four annual funds whose purpose was to invest in start-
up companies, and particularly companies in the field of virtual reality 
technologies. 
The information filed today alleges that the defendant partially funded his 
capital commitment to the second of those funds by committing bank fraud. 
Specifically, in 2014, the defendant made false statements about his wealth to his 
bank while refinancing his home mortgage and while obtaining a $300,000 
personal loan, and poured some of the ill-gotten money he obtained from the bank 
into the second of his funds. 
In 2015, the information alleges that the defendant took excess money in 
venture capital fees from one of the funds he was raising and managing, and 
therefore faced a shortfall at the end of the year that he did not wish to report to 
his investors. At the end of 2015, the information alleges that the defendant 
engaged in a scheme to defraud a bank by making false statements and 
misrepresentations to the bank in order to obtain a $4 million line of credit to pay 
back the fund from which he had taken excess fees. In so doing, the defendant 
attempted to deceive his investors into believing the fund was well-managed and 
was following the operating agreements the investors understood controlled the 
management of the fund. 
In February 2016, according to the allegations laid out in the information, 
the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud an investor with respect to a $2 
million investment that it believed it was making directly into a virtual reality 
content production company that the defendant contended he wholly-owned. It is 
alleged that, rather than using that investment as he had represented, the defendant 
used most of it for other purposes. 
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The complaint then alleges that, in July 2016, the defendant engaged in a 
scheme to defraud as many as five separate investors when he induced them to 
wire a total of $1.35 million under the premise of investing in the untraded stock 
of a privately-held software company. The complaint charges the defendant with 
knowingly engaging in a scheme to defraud one investor by representing to that 
organization that its money would be used to purchase the software company’s 
shares. According to the complaint, on the same day the money was wired, the 
defendant took the money from the bank account designed to make the investment 
and sent it to a main operating bank account, from which it was used for many 
purposes. The complaint alleges that no stock in the software company was ever 
purchased.  
Finally, the information sets out allegations about a series of investors as 
to whom the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud in 2015 and 2016 by 
inducing their investments in his managed funds under the premise he would use 
the money for investments in “frontier edge” technologies and take only certain 
limited fees for the management of the funds. Instead, the defendant took more 
fees than to which he was entitled and invested far less of the money he raised 
than the operating agreements disclosed to the investors contemplated. 
Today’s allegations in the criminal complaint and information state that 
the evidence has established that since 2013, the defendant fraudulently obtained 
at least $18.8 million through his illegal conduct. (p. 1) 
After reviewing the court’s news release and reviewing the case as filed with the 
courts from June 26, 2020, this particular case appeared to align with two behavioral 
theories: the RAT and the TPB. As Cohen and Felson (1979) posited, unlawful activities 
are brought together through conditions exhibited in this case, along with investors (the 
targets) and lacked protectors to these types of criminal activities. Equally, the TPB 
demonstrates the insufficiency of following any type of behavioral control, antecedents of 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control that lead to predictors with 
intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991).  
In these two instances with behavioral theories, the offender targeted investors 
who were all naive to activities outside of their purview. Furthermore, the offender used 
an elaborate strategy of being in control of many financial schemes that lacked any type 
of checks and balances. The lack of behavioral norms accepted by society did not play a 
role, which explains why TPB is in alignment with the outcome.  
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Lab Experiment 3: Artifact 3 
The third lab experiment was identified by Artifact ID 320-CR-00245. Similar to 
the last experiment’s volume of court data, the lexicons retrieved from this case yielded 
an 18% hit rate increase over the previous experiment. The United States District Court, 
Northern District of California, San Francisco Division provided data from a case with 
multiple counts, including defrauding 21 financial institutions under false pretenses and 
bank fraud.  
Unlike previous experiments, a data conversion from OCR to PDF required an 
additional step, which was outlined within the GPFLE process. This dissertation study 
followed the same GPFLE process during Lab Experiment 3 and supplemented the 
process with the following activities: determine artifact scores, tweet negative emotion 
scores, optimal classification, and artifact negative summary. 
This dissertation study used the WEKA preprocess tab and created statistics for 
27 attributes (see Table 5) to include attributes with the lowest (see Appendix K) Tweet 
negative emotion sentiment scores (see Figure 14). The attributes included values derived 
from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” 
“TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and “TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” 
filters. An alternate view is presented (see Figure 15). Unlike prior experiments and 
through manual testing various classifiers, Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes 
(DMNB) was the selected classification. A concerted effort included manually selecting 
other classifiers, but none fared better than DMNB when applied against the Twitter 
tweets (see Figures 16–19). More importantly, the classifier correctly identified 94.79%, 




Artifact 3 Detailed Scores 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
Sentiment weight -3.2 3.1 .712 1.542 




0 .882 .033 .133 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
posScore 
0 5 .25 .482 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
negScore 
-4.999 0 -.382 .454 
NRC-10-Anger 0 1 .064 .245 
NRC-10-Trust 0 1 .106 .307 
NRC-10-Negative 0 1 .122 .327 
NRC-10-Positive 0 1 .209 .407 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anger 
0 .713 .026 .069 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anticipation 
0 .314 .063 .089 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Disgust 
0 .464 .012 .035 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Fear 





Table 5  
Artifact 3 Detailed Scores (continued) 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Joy 
0 .724 .108 .217 
NRC-10-Sadness 0 .807 .32 .119 
NRC-10-Surprise 0 .149 .025 .043 
NRC-10-Trust  0 .684 .118 .18 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Negative 
0 .956 .076 .169 
NRC-10-Expanded 
Positive 
0 .883 .207 .304 
SentiWordnet-
posScore 
0 1.539 .335 .476 
SentiWordnet-
negScore 
-1.067 0 -.094 .221 
Mpqa-posCount 0 1 .512 .5 
Mpqa-negCount 0 1 .147 .354 
BingLiu-negCount 0 1 .151 .358 
AFINN-posScore 0 3 .795 .99 
AFINN-negScore -4 0 -.477 .938 
S140-posScore 0 1.707 .32 .381 
S140-negscore -2.148 0 -.194 .407 
 
 


























Figure 19. Artifact 3 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes - Part 4. 
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.948 
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s 
weighted average scored a 0.003; exceptionally low. The non-weighted average for the 
Precision was manually calculated at an average of 0.958 and appears comparable to 
experiment two.  
Although this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values, this is 
likely due the inability to be assigned to the class, and not based the volume of data; 
opposite of the previous experiment. Instances of zero-valued classes accounted for 
eleven negative lexicons; felony, imposed, liability, losses, offenses, questioned, 
suspended, victims, violation, violence, and weapon. Class values greater than zero and 
less than one accounted for four negative lexicons; arrested, conspiracy, error, and 
victim. And the last class with values equal to one accounted for fifteen lexicons abuse, 
crime, criminal, dangerous, death, fraud, gross, guilty, injury, leave, loss, low, offense, 
pay, and risk; appearing in negative lexicon listings (see Appendix S). Furthermore, this 
experiment’s classification of all TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons 
associated with fraud and differ from the preceding experiments.  
The takeaway from using DMNB within the experiment is the classifier provided 
similar results for TPR classes having zero values, yet provided similar benefits when 
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seeking negative social lexicons that could be associated with fraud. Moreover, DMNB 
demonstrated an extremely low FPR and a high percentage of precision when properly 
evaluated; not applicable across the board when both TPR and FPR values were zero. 
Conjointly, the zero values for TPR and FPR impacted both F-Measure, and MCC, while 
the weighted average for ROC was 0.999. This dissertation study did not expect these 
results, yet it is posited the outcome is based on some data not being assigned to a class; 
notably from previous experiments, the same held true. However, some lexicon class 
attributes are conducive in vetting social media tweets and could help mitigate insider 
threats from the most earliest onset.  
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required the examination of 
relevant behavioral theories as applied to the court collected data. The following article 
provides a summary of events. Fox Business (2014) stated the following: 
A California man has pleaded guilty for his role in a nationwide automobile loan 
fraud scheme the U.S. Secret Service discovered in Pennsylvania last year. The 
defendant, 30, of Hercules, California, allegedly solicited straw purchasers and 
then lied about their creditworthiness so the conspirators could obtain auto loans 
that were never paid back. The crooks split the money among themselves, costing 
21 victim banks and credit unions in several states $1 million to $2.4 million, 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Marshall Piccinini told a federal judge Friday. Among 
other things, the defendant faked borrowers' tax and wage documents and used 
vehicle identification numbers from real cars that were not actually for sale. 
Banks were told the loans were being used to pay for vehicles being sold by two 
fictitious firms, Gold Coast Group Worldwide and AM Auto Groups. Banks lost 
money because there was no real collateral to secure the loans. Philip pleaded 
guilty before U.S. District Judge David Cercone in Pittsburgh because the scheme 
was uncovered last year by U.S. Secret Service agents in Erie, about two hours 
north of Pittsburgh. The Erie Federal Credit Union and Erie Community Credit 
Union were among the financial institutions victimized, Piccinini said. The 
prosecutor wouldn't say how many other people prosecutors believe were 
involved in the scheme, only that the defendant is the first to be prosecuted. 
Piccinini wouldn't say if others would be charged in Pennsylvania or other 
jurisdictions where the fraud played out. In all, 64 phony borrowers attempted 150 
bogus loans. Piccinini wouldn't say how many loans were successful, or how 
many people in the scheme worked as "brokers," ''managers," or "processors" of 
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loans described in the charges filed against the defendant. The defendant 
established bank accounts in the name of a phony firm, -- Investments Inc., 
through which some of the loan proceeds were moved. Investigators have traced 
$544,000 from the scheme to the defendant’s bank accounts, but say at least 
$219,000 of that was paid out to other participants. Piccinini wouldn't say what 
may have happened to the rest of the money. The government is not seeking to 
force the defendant to forfeit any money, which is often done in financial fraud 
crimes, but he may be ordered to pay restitution to the banks when he's sentenced 
Feb. 23. The defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud and a separate count of 
conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. Both charges carry up to 30 years in 
prison. (p. 1) 
Review of the court’s case filed on June 19, 2020 appeared to align with two 
behavioral theories: the RAT and the TPB. As in the previous experiment and applicable 
is Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory with unlawful activities coming together through 
conditions exhibited in this case; along with banks and credit unions (the targets) and 
lacked protectors to these types of criminal activities. Equally important, the TPB 
demonstrates the insufficiency of following any type of behavioral control, antecedents of 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control that lead to predictors with 
intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991), and appears to be demonstrated by greed. 
In these two instances, the offenders appeared to target investors who were all 
blind-eyed to activities outside of their knowledge using an elaborate strategy of being in 
control of many financial schemes that lacked any type of checks and balances. 
Lab Experiment 4: Artifact 4 
The fourth lab experiment was identified by the artifact ID 4-15-CV-01490. 
Although similar to prior experiments, the case differed by changing from a single 
deceptive defendant to a business representing a different view of an entity’s fraudulent 
activities. The experiment included an increase of volume with court data. The lexicons 
retrieved from the case yielded a 38% hit rate increase over the previous experiment. 
Like the previous experiment, data were retrieved from The United States District Court, 
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Northern District of California. The San Francisco Division provided data from a 
company that defrauded its customers with merchandise that did not meet the State’s 
code for selling products with formaldehyde. According to USCourts.gov (2020) 
Northern District of California:  
The action arises from Defendants’ unlawful, unfair, fraudulent and misleading 
advertising, marketing and selling of their Chinese-manufactured laminate 
flooring (“laminate flooring”) to consumers in California as compliant with 
formaldehyde emission standards promulgated by the California Air Resources 
Board (“CARB”). Defendants engaged in and continue to engage in this 
misleading advertising campaign in an effort to deceive consumers into 
purchasing its laminate flooring products. In fact, the products contain and emit 
formaldehyde at levels in excess of CARB standards. Formaldehyde, a colorless 
gas, is a substance known to cause cancer. The National Toxicology Program 
within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has classified 
formaldehyde as a known human carcinogen. Formaldehyde exposure in the 
short-term can cause irritation of the skin, eyes, nose, and throat, respiratory 
problems such as asthma, and neurological impairment. Long-term exposure to 
formaldehyde can result in an increased risk of developing certain types of cancer. 
Children and the elderly are at a heightened risk from formaldehyde exposure. 
Putting profits ahead of safety, the company specifically recommends its laminate 
flooring for consumers who have children. “Laminate flooring is recommended 
for an environment where the ‘challenges’ of children and pets exist, and it is not 
significantly noisier than other hard flooring surfaces. (p. 2–3) 
Just as the previous experiment required a data conversion from PDF using OCR, 
the same was applied to this experiment. The documents appeared to be scanned from 
within the courts and into an electronic format, with many pages not correctly aligned 
during the scanning process and required the use of OCR software.   
This dissertation study continued to follow the same GPFLE process for Lab 
Experiment 4. This process was supplemented with the successive activities in capturing 
all sentiment attributes (see Table 6), with the lowest negative sentiment scores (see 
Appendix K) and validation using the Naïve Bayes classification. The attributes included 
values derived from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” 
“TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and 
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“TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” filters. As expected, four negative sentiments 
scored low and yielded a score of -2.08, whereas the S140-negScore and the NRC-Hash-
Sent-negScores both yielded a score of -4.999 (see Figure 20). An alternate view is also 
presented with the negative summary (see Figure 21).  
Table 6 
Artifact 4 Detailed Scores 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
Sentiment weight -3.4 3.2 .424 1.006 




0 .667 .018 .104 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
posScore 
0 1.416 .142 .227 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
negScore 
-4.999 0 -.325 .51 
NRC-10-Anger 0 1 .039 .295 
NRC-10-Trust 0 1 .099 .402 
NRC-10-Negative 0 1 .092 .295 





Table 6  
Artifact 4 Detailed Scores (continued) 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anger 
0 .746 .076 .008 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anticipation 
0 .285 .061 .034 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Disgust 
0 .384 .067 .002 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Fear 
0 .875 .048 .008 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Joy 
0 .39 .053 .027 
NRC-10-Sadness 0 .72 .059 .205 
NRC-10-Surprise 0 .132 .027 0 
NRC-10-Trust  0 .684 .087 .402 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Negative 
0 .982 .267 .295 
NRC-10-Expanded 
Positive 
0 .883 .148 .408 
SentiWordnet-
posScore 
0 1.539 .255 .027 
SentiWordnet-
negScore 
-.208 0 -.184 .08 
Mpqa-posCount 0 1 .552 .066 
Mpqa-negCount 0 1 .152 .307 
BingLiu-negCount 0 1 .126 .307 
AFINN-posScore 0 3 .729 .489 
AFINN-negScore -4 0 -.432 .923 
S140-posScore 0 3.614 .22 .291 
S140-negscore -4.999 0 -.372 .274 
 
The preceding attributes represents the direct correlations between sentiment 
found in court cases that is paired to known negative sentiments used in the GPFLE 
process and content extracted from Tweets. Thus, one can hypothesize that negative 
sentiment associated with forms of fraud can be extracted from social media, as shown in 




Figure 20. Artifact 4 Tweet negative emotion scores. 
 
 
Figure 21. Artifact 4 negative summary. 
 
The Naïve Bayes classification score was average when compared with other 
experiments (see Figures 22–27) and correctly identified the classification instances 70% 
of the time. The important takeaway was the overall average for all experiments’ 
classification rather than this particular classification results. In this instance, instead of 
using the Auto-WEKA package, manually testing classifiers led to Naïve Bayes as the 
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best option and produced fair results with the accuracy of classifications and a Kappa 
score of 0.6822. 
 
 






















Figure 26. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 5. 
 
 
Figure 27. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 6. 
 
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.700 
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s 
weighted average scored a 0.005; comparable to the previous experiment. The weighted 




Again, this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values; no 
positive data. Some instances with zero-valued classes accounted for twenty-eight 
negative lexicons; cancer, complained, complaint, complaints, deceive, deceived, delay, 
denying, excluded, fail, failing, fails, faulty, lawsuit, misleading, offends, oppressive, 
questioned, refused, suffer, suffered, unaware, unethical, unfair, violate, violation, 
violations, and warn. Class values greater than zero and less than one accounted for 
twenty-four negative lexicons; attacks, cut, devastating, exposed, failed, hard, harm, 
immoral, injured, injury, lies, limited, lost, low, lower, no, problems, punish, refuse, risk, 
risks, scare, trouble, and wrong. And the last class with values equal to one accounted six 
lexicons demand, fight, fraud, illegal, lowering, and touted (see Appendix T).  
Unlike previous experiments, this experiment supplied more data; 5,926 class 
instances. Because of this, the total number of undefined TPR and FPR results did not 
exist; only zero values. In turn, the calculations for Recall, F-Measure, MCC, and ROC 
was possible. For these attributes, the following outcome was likely. First, the weighted 
averages for Recall yielded 0.700 and considered good in terms of correctly labeling 
lexicons. Second, the F-Measure yielded 0.713; acceptable. Third, the MCC yielded 
0.709, not a complete agreement but nearest to 1.0 and acceptable. The ROC yielded 
0.994 as its optimal threshold of false positives. The supportive outcome provided the 
identification of lexicon classes conducive in vetting social media tweets and could help 
mitigate insider threats from the most earliest onset.  
Lastly, the impact of Artifact 4 included both business partners and consumers 
and appeared to fall within two theories. The theory of reasoned action (TRA) is used to 
reveal the meaningful effects of attitudes and subjective norms. In this particular case, the 
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business appeared to follow a subjective norm common with other business owners’ 
practices. The behavior is in alignment with Hale, Householder and Greene’s (2002) 
assessment to subjective norms. Similarly, the business specifically sought suitable 
targets in the absence of guardians against crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979) in order to 
carry out their business practices and part of the routine activity theory (RAT). 
Lab Experiment 5:Artifact 5 
Lab Experiment 5 was identified by Artifact I.D. 3-16-cv-02600. This experiment 
demonstrated an example of fraud with a deceptive business practice, posing a threat to 
consumers and business partners. In this instance, a corporation knowingly practiced a 
deceptive business model to increase its profits. A comparison of the experiment’s data 
collection to other samples places the volume of data inline to several other experiments 
with 33 pages of court-produced documents.  
Data were retrieved from The United States District Court, Northern District of 
Illinois. The Northern District provided data from a class-action lawsuit that alleged an 
automotive manufacturer violated the Clean Air Act and EPA guidelines through the 
selling of faulty vehicles as part of a much larger scheme to deceive EPA testing 
procedures. According to USCourts.gov (2020) Northern District of Illinois:    
Any person to manufacture or sell, or offer to sell, or install, any part or 
component intended for use with, or as part of, any motor vehicle engine, where a 
principal effect of the part or component is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative 
any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor 
vehicle engine in compliance with regulations under this subchapter, and where 
the person knows or should know that such part or component is being offered for 
sale or installed for such use or put to such use. (p. 5) 
This dissertation study followed the same GPFLE process in Lab Experiment 5 
and supplemented the process with the successive activities in capturing all sentiment 
attributes (see Table 7) with the lowest tweet negative emotion scores (see Figure 28) and 
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validation using the OneR classification. The attributes included values derived from 
“TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” 
“TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and “TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” 
filters. All provided the following results and expanded with further granularity. 
Analogous to previous experiments, four negative (see Appendix K) sentiments scored 
low, producing an NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore of -4.999. Equally, the SentiWordnet-
negScore (-1.696), S140-negScore (-2.41), and AFINN-negScore (-4) was comparable to 
other experiments. An alternate view (see Figure 29) is also presented and shows the 




Artifact 5 Detailed Scores 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
Sentiment weight -2.8 3.2 1.019 1.391 




0 .75 .007 .053 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
posScore 
0 3.117 .231 .39 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
negScore 
-4.999 0 -.27 .413 
NRC-10-Anger 0 1 .017 .129 
NRC-10-Trust 0 1 .161 .367 
NRC-10-Negative 0 1 .057 .232 
NRC-10-Positive 0 1 .22 .414 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anger 
0 .686 .096 .116 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anticipation 
0 .404 .051 .086 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Disgust 
0 .728 .146 .185 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Fear 
0 .727 .111 .153 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Joy 
0 .724 .083 .184 
NRC-10-Sadness 0 .807 .07 .108 
NRC-10-Surprise 0 .149 .032 .035 
NRC-10-Trust  0 .472 .065 .106 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Negative 





Table 7  
Artifact 5 Detailed Scores (continued) 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
NRC-10-Expanded 
Positive 
0 .877 .156 .27 
SentiWordnet-
posScore 
0 2.586 .698 .827 
SentiWordnet-
negScore 
-1.696 0 -.084 .173 
Mpqa-posCount 0 1 .628 .483 
Mpqa-negCount 0 1 .05 .219 
BingLiu-negCount 0 1 .047 .211 
AFINN-posScore 0 3 1.376 1.119 
AFINN-negScore -4 0 -.294 .593 
S140-posScore 0 2.064 .334 .45 
S140-negscore -2.41 0 -.198 .374 
 
The results represent the direct correlations between sentiment found in court 
cases that is paired to known negative sentiments used in the GPFLE process and content 
extracted from Tweets. Thus, one can hypothesize that negative sentiment associated 
with forms of fraud can be extracted from social media, as shown in the collective 








Figure 29. Artifact 5 negative summary. 
The outcome classification scored compared slightly better than the previous 
experiment; Naïve Bayes (see Figures 30 –35) and correctly identified the classification 
instances 78% of the time. Like other experiments, the study continued to manually test 





























Figure 34. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 5. 
 




Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.780 
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s 
weighted average scored a 0.004; comparable to the previous experiment. The weighted 
average with the Precision was undetermined through the automated process within 
WEKA and manual calculation with TPR / (TPR + FPR) produced an average of 0.995; 
acceptable, but the appears to be slightly higher than previous experiments, but 
comparable to experiment 3.  
Like other experiments, this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without 
values, and could represent no corresponding class assignments. For instance, zero-
valued classes accounted for thirty-six negative lexicons; avoided, burdens, complaint, 
deceive, deceived, deception, delay, dispute, disregard, excluded, exploiting, failures, 
futile, grossly, harmed, harsh, hoax, immoral, inability, liability, losses, misleading, 
offend, punish, reckless, sluggish, touted, uncertain, unethical, unfair, unjust, victims, 
violated, violation, and violations. Class values greater than zero and less than one 
accounted for eight negative lexicons; burden, confusion defeat, delay, difficult, failed, 
failure, and fraud. And the last class with values equal to one accounted six negative 
lexicons; alone, illegal, injury, negative, and pay (see Appendix U). Also, this 
experiment’s classification of all TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons 
associated with fraud and differ from the preceding experiments.  
Although this experiment supplied more data with 7,515 class instances, the 
outcome provided an explanation as to specific attributes set to undefined. The initial 
assessment postulated the lack of data caused similar results in previous experiments. In 
this instance, that is not the case. Having more data did not prove to be more beneficial, 
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and it is believed the disparity is a result from the type of data being processed, same 
overall court system, but a uniqueness in content. Further examination has shown the 
weighted averages for Precision, F-Measure, and MCC was uncalculated; some data 
could not be assigned to a given class. 
For these attributes, the following outcome was possible. First, the weighted 
averages for Recall yielded 0.780 and like the previous experiment considered good in 
terms of correctly labeling lexicons. Second, ROC yielded 0.995 as its optimal threshold 
of false positives. The supportive outcome provided the identification of some lexicon 
classes conducive in vetting social media tweets and could help mitigate insider threats 






The theories that correlate best with this case are protection motivation theory 
(PMT) and routine activity theory (RAT). Protection motivation theory represents the 
cognitive processes to mediate the persuasive effects of a fear appeal by arousing 
protection motivation. In this case, it appears dwindling sales was a motivation and 
according to Maddux and Rogers (1983), the protection motivation came from self-
preservation with keeping the business afloat. Furthermore, one could theorize the danger 
felt by the manufacturer might be construed with the fear from competitors and led to the 
business finding suitable targets, the consumer and in alignment with RAT. 
Lab Experiment 6: Artifact 6 
Experiment 6 was identified by Artifact ID 3-16-CV-01547. In this case, an 
employee of a business exhibited fraudulent practices. As in the previous instance, the 
study leveraged an all-encompassing and differing angle for fraud through an employee 
associated with the banking industry. The experiment included an increase of 
classifications over the previous experiment, yet similarities was discovered through 
court data.  
Data were retrieved from The United States District Court, Southern District of 
California. The Southern District provided data from a bank that demonstrated a former 
contractor’s unwillingness to return the bank’s laptop and its proprietary software. In 
addition to the contractor’s possession of the laptop came threats to sell the bank’s private 
and sensitive information to anyone willing to pay the highest price. According to 
USCourts.gov (2020) Southern District of California:  
The Bank seeks immediate injunctive relief from this Court to compel Deaver to 
refrain from disclosing and selling any of the Bank’s trade secret information and 
to order him to return to the Bank the property that he literally stole. The Bank 
will be irreparably harmed if Deaver is not ordered to return the laptop and source 
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code that he stole and claims to have provided and disclosed to third parties. If 
there is a case worthy of a temporary restraining order to stop the criminal 
conduct of a rogue contractor who is intent on carrying out his criminal threats, 
this is it. (p. 2) 
Just as earlier experiments required a data conversion from PDF using OCR, the 
same was applied to this experiment. The documents appeared to be scanned from within 
the courts and into an electronic format, with many pages not correctly aligned during the 
scanning process and required the use of OCR software. 
This dissertation study followed the GPFLE process for Lab Experiment 6 and 
supplemented the process with the successive activities in capturing all sentiment 
attributes (see Table 8) with the lowest negative sentiment scores from the most 
prominent scores (see Figure 36). An alternate summary view (see Figure 37) is also 
presented and shows the lowest four negative sentiment scores and validation using the 
DMNB classification (see Figures 38-43). A common theme between experiments was 
the four negative (see Appendix K) sentiment scores. For example, the S140-negScore (-
2.148), AFINN-negScore (-4.0), SentiWordnet-negScore (-2.148), and NRC-Hash-Sent-




Artifact 6 Detailed Scores 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
Sentiment weight -3.2 3.1 .712 1.542 




0 .882 .033 .133 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
posScore 
0 5 .025 .482 
NRC-Hash-Sent-
negScore 
-4.999 0 -.382 .454 
NRC-10-Anger 0 1 .064 .245 
NRC-10-Trust 0 1 .106 .307 
NRC-10-Negative 0 1 .122 .327 





Table 8  
Artifact 6 Detailed Scores (continued) 
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anger 
0 .713 .026 .069 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Anticipation 
0 .314 .063 .089 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Disgust 
0 .464 .012 .035 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Fear 
0 .74 .24 .08 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Joy 
0 .724 .108 .217 
NRC-10-Sadness 0 .807 .32 .119 
NRC-10-Surprise 0 .149 .025 .043 
NRC-10-Trust  0 .684 .118 .18 
NRC-10-Expanded-
Negative 
0 .956 .076 .169 
NRC-10-Expanded 
Positive 








-1.067 0 -.094 .221 
Mpqa-posCount 0 1 .512 .5 
Mpqa-negCount 0 1 .147 .354 
BingLiu-negCount 0 1 .151 .358 
AFINN-posScore 0 3 .795 .99 
AFINN-negScore -4 0 -.477 .938 
S140-posScore 0 1.707 .32 .381 
S140-negscore -2.148 0 -.194 .407 
 
The results represent the direct correlations between sentiment found in court 
cases that is paired to known negative sentiments used in the GPFLE process and content 
extracted from Tweets. Thus, one can hypothesize that negative sentiment associated 




Figure 36. Artifact 6 Tweet negative emotion scores.  
 
The classification scored comparatively better than the previous experiment, 
correctly identified the classification instances 92% of the time, and yielded a Kappa 
score of 0.9257. The important takeaway from these results is the overall average for the 
classifications of all experiments rather than this set of results.  
 




























Figure 42. Artifact 6 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification – Part 5. 
 
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.929 
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s 
weighted average scored a 0.002; comparable to other experiments. Like the previous 
experiment, the weighted average with Precision was undetermined through the 
automated process within WEKA and manual calculation with TPR / (TPR + FPR) 
produced an average of 0.492; although this might be acceptable, the value is definitely 
lower than previous experiments.  
As in other experiments, this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers 
without values, and represents instances where the data cannot be assigned to a class. 
Instances of zero-valued classes accounted for twenty-four negative lexicons; abuse, 
avoided, complained, complaint, demanded, demanding, destruction, disregard, hacked, 
harmed, preventing, refused, refusing restricting, suspected, threatened, threatens, 
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threats, unacceptable, unethical, unjust, violate, violated, and violation. Class values 
greater than zero and less than one accounted for seven negative lexicons; destroying, 
failing, failure, lawsuit, steal, suffered, and threatening. The last class with values equal 
to one accounted for twelve negative lexicons; alone, crime, criminal, damage, demand, 
destroy, difficult, failed, fraud, gross, harm, and illegal (see Appendix V). Also, this 
experiment’s classification of all TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons 
associated with fraud and differ from the preceding experiments.  
Analogous to the previous experiment, similarities exist in the failure to compute 
the weighted averages for the Precision, F-Measure, and MCC; all attributed to some of 
the data. Initially, it was believed to be caused by the lack of data, but in this instance, it 
appears to be related to instances not being able to have class assignments. Additionally, 
the weighted average for Recall at 0.929 and ROC of 0.997; an optimal threshold. 
Correspondingly to other experiments interpretation with behavioral theories, 
RAT best applies to this case. In this instance, the contractor appeared to knowingly 
select a target thought to be incapable of defending itself, which revealed the absence of 
capable guardians against crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). However, what the contractor 
did not realize at the time was the bank’s trade secrets on the laptop and the willingness 




Based on known and well-established negative sentiments, the study revealed that 
the fraudulent sentiments that exist in the legal system also exist in social media. This 
dissertation study applied an identical methodology in each lab experiment and found 
cynical sentiments within the publicly available Twitter tweets, correlation to unique and 
negative social media lexicons with attributes from a fraudulent context, and documented 
within the legal system from cases involving some degree of fraud. While some lab 
experiments either experienced a lack of data or data not assigned with the listed classes, 
many instances held values supportive to the outcome (see Appendix Q, R, S, T, U, and 
V). 
The upfront notation to use Auto-WEKA to select the best classification 
algorithm was not the best option and was changed due to precisions of correctly 
identifying instances within the experiments. The experiments used three classifications: 
Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and DMNB. Although this dissertation study experienced 
technical challenges earlier in the research; for instance, an essential WEKA plug-in kept 
causing problems, yet the problems were overcome. Other time-intensive operations 
appeared unique because the research operated within one physical location and did not 
leverage cloud-based technologies.  
Each experiment’s ending required a case review from each set of court 
documents. These case reviews were paired to one or more behavioral theories and found 
six cases that aligned with the RAT, two cases that aligned with the TPB, one case that 
aligned with the TRA, and one case that aligned with the protection motivation theory. 
Not all anticipated theories were applicable, yet this dissertation study found one 
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behavioral theory to be more prevalent in many lab experiments. RAT appeared to touch 
all aspects of court cases. This study’s findings confirmed Cohen and Felson’s (1979) 
behavioral theory was demonstrated through criminal acts coming down to a merging of  
offenders and targets, the element of timing, and not having any forms of protection 
against criminal activities become relevant predictors.  
Summary of Results 
Sentiment scoring to include relevant behavioral theories, classification variables, 
and exercise specific data (see Table 9) is outlined. All experiments shared three core 
commonalities; all relatable to RAT, used Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) 7,063 sentiment 
lexicons, and all accessed the same 20,000 Twitter tweets. Experiments 2-6 reached the 
lower negative NRC-Hash-SentnegScore of -4.990; nearly the lowest possible value of -
5.0. Within the context of negativity, this represents tweets of sadness, anger, fear, or 
disgust and is outlined in Bravo-Marquez et al.’s (2015) works (see Appendix K).  
Experiments 3,5, and 6 produced the lowest scoring for SentWordnet-negScore, 
and according to Baccianella et al. (2010), the correlation related to the top-ranked 
negative synsets. Similarly, experiments 1,3,4,5, and 6 showed a fair amount of 
negativity in the AFINN-negScore with a low value of -4.0. Furthermore, the S140-
negScore for experiments 3-6 appeared to demonstrate negativity in emotion-aware 
tweets.  
Also, all experiments included various classifications, including Trees Random 
Forest, Naïve Bayes, and Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes. Kappa values within 
each experiment provided greater accuracy and according to Sahoo’s (2013) findings, 
finer accuracy is achieved when values are higher than zero. Experiments 1,2,3, and 6 
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showed nearly perfect agreements with Kappa (see Appendix M) and experiments 4 and 
5 demonstrated substantial agreements.  
Examining each experiment’s TPR, provided acceptable values and representative 
of positive classes correctly classified by a model is achieved (Azar et al., 2014) with 
experiments 1-6 yielding the following respective values of 0.873, 0.850, 0.948, 0.700, 
0.780, and 0.929. In contrast, the FPR represents the fraction of negative classes that are 
identified as positive, and in these instances, all experiments appeared to score 
exceptionally low. All six experiments yielded the following respective values of 0.039, 
0.009, 0.003, 0.005, 0.004, and 0.002. Ideally, the class precision’s weighted averages 
would have been closer to 1.0 and represent the exactness of a classifier (Kaur & Saini, 
2015) and correlate to fewer false positives. In half the experiments, 1,4, and 6, the FPR 
came to 0.539, 0.736, and 0.492. Conversely, experiments 2,3, and 5 yielded 0.999, 
0.958, and 0.995.    
The uniqueness between experiments is directly contributed to the content within 
the obtained legal documents. While each court case had anywhere between 1 and 36 
pages of transcripts, it appears each showed relevance in the number of collected 
instances processed by the classifiers. For example, each respective experiment yielded 
157, 206, 1,846, 5,926, 7,515, and 3,269 records of data. The overall holistic capture of 
data appears to provide a glimpse into the value of traversing tweets to identify possible 
insider threats. Furthermore, while limited in scope to fraudulent cases, there appears to 
be relevancy when examining data within the legal system and finding likenesses within 
publicly available tweets. And lastly, organizations could leverage these findings within 




Summary of Results 






















-0.180 -0.180 -2.148 -4.990 -2.410 -2.148 
Theory Applicable 
theory 
RAT RAT/TPB RAT/TPB RAT/TRA RAT/PMT RAT 
Instances Records of 
data 










Naïve Bayes Naïve Bayes Discriminative 
multinomial 
Kappa Kappa score 0.8055 0.8106 0.9449 0.6822 0.7588 0.9257 
TPR True positive 
rate 
0.873 0.850 0.948 0.700 0.780 0.929 
FPR False 
positive rate 
0.039 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 





7,063 7,063 7,063 7,063 7,063 7,063 
Twitter tweets Maximum 
available 
20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 
Legal documents Pages 1 22 23 36 33 23 








Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
This dissertation study found correlations from data extracted from both fraud and 
social media inputs. The benefits of machine learning, in-depth analysis of data, and 
coupling of theories that elaborated on behavioral aspects with insider threat mindsets 
(see Figure 43) produced evidence that proved beneficial in mitigating an insider threat at 
an early onset. 
 




Conversely, this dissertation study aimed to gather evidence to meet the 
objectives created by the IT artifacts in proving useful in threat predictions (see Figure 
44). Three objectives; first, aimed to draw on correlations between negative sentiments 
found in various fraudulent cases and the same lexicons found in social media tweets. 
The goal within this context was to provide a preemployment vetting tool to identify 
individuals showing similarities with insider threat behaviors. Second, aimed to go 
beyond natural language processing’s shortcomings to find commonalities fraudulent 
contexts within all lab experiments, including behavioral theories common and 
paramount among all fraudulent cases. And third, the analysis of relevant data attributed 
with varying degrees of fraud.  
 




This dissertation study contributed to positive outcomes; however, limitations 
surfaced. First, focus was exclusively on English content from fraudulent cases and 
collected social inputs from Tweets. A more elaborate study could build upon threats in 
other languages and pull data from Instagram, YouTube, or similar platforms. Second, 
fraud-related insider threats only scratch the surface with a few types of threats. Other 
forms of insider threats could include other forms of white-collar crimes. According to  
H.G. Legal Resources (2020), other forms of crimes include the following:  
Insurance fraud including automotive insurance, homeowner insurance, medical 
insurance and Medicaid insurance may all involve people who attempt to commit 
fraud. Insider trading, securities fraud, hedge fund fraud and stock manipulation 
are white collar crimes that may be committed when stocks or bonds are involved. 
Computer fraud, wire fraud and mail fraud may also be the  result of white-collar 
crimes. White collar crimes also include identity theft, mortgage broker fraud, 
bribery, embezzlement, and tax evasion. These crimes are some of the most 
common types of white-collar crimes. These crimes all have the similarity that the 
ultimate goal is to receive some type of economic or financial gain. (para. 4) 
Third, the initial assessment gravitated in using Facebook as a significant source 
of inputs; however, during testing with sample data, the source did not produce sufficient 
data for analysis. At that time, Twitter was selected and required additional time for 
approvals. This dissertation study applied for developer’s access and waited weeks for 
approval, which delayed the research process. In hindsight, the approval process should 
have been initiated earlier in the research process. Fourth, the lab experiments provided 
insight into answering the research questions.  
Research Question 1 asked: Was there sufficient literature on insider threat 
mitigation strategies? The answer to this question was yes. This dissertation study 
gathered a fair amount of literature that was published between 2013 and 2019. The 
literature covered three core areas examined by the study and included monitoring and 
profiling, rulemaking and policies, and employment vetting.  
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Under the umbrella of monitoring and profiling, Cole (2015) pointed out the 
majority of current mitigation efforts include monitoring of both internal and external 
networks. In this instance, Cappelli et al. (2009) found the level of practicality did not 
appear the best solution for an institution, while Kühn et al. (2017) found any benefits 
with monitoring events not fruitful when dealing with the analysis from intrusion- 
detection monitoring. Supportive to a monitoring analysis, Benferhat et al. (2013) 
suggested when dealing with a dynamic and changing environment, referencing a 
baseline can become an ineffective approach. In other instances, Shaw (2006) discovered 
supervisors required the knowledge to know whether or not an employee is disgruntled 
through evaluating risk factors and became apparent there is a delay within the mitigation 
strategy. Comparatively, Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) delved deep into missing 
key alerts through false negatives within SIEM technologies. Furthermore, Vilendečić et 
al. (2017) suggested key implementations within SIEM required lowering false-positives 
or preventive action cannot be taken at the right time (Ambre & Shekokar, 2015).  
As the literature suggests, policy enforcement does very little in terms of 
changing employees’ mindsets. For instance, literature has demonstrated Acceptable Use 
Policies are fairly common, yet becomes worthless if employees do not become aware of 
them (Alshboul & Streff, 2017) and Gallagher et al. (2015) suggested an inadequate 
implementation will not alter users’ postures towards insider threat preventions. Linkov 
et al. (2019) theorized policies that are over and under-regulated can become exploitable. 
Antoniou et al. (1999) suggested competing principles can drive conflicts, then promote 
an unclear direction to employees who rely on voluntary compliance and cooperation 
(Pelton, 2017). Moreover, according to Bauer (2017), despite having policies in place at 
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an organizational level, employees intentionally are noncompliant; due to carelessness, 
poor knowledge, or clear intention to act dishonestly (Nawawi & Salin, 2018).  
The literature on employee vetting is the basis for this study and some approaches 
were demonstrated within failures within current vetting practices. According to Kühn 
and Nieman (2017), flaws can be contributed to the over-reliance of information 
collected from the employee, and regardless of the layers of vetting, people still pass 
through the process. Lomas (2019) discovered personnel responsible for vetting officials 
is flawed, along with Jeske et al.’s (2019) findings of faults with voluntary employee 
disclosures; not solidify sound practices (Hielscher & Waghorn, 2015). Lastly, Roulin 
and Bourdage (2017) discovered it is possible to uncover personality traits during the 
interviewing process, while Maasberg et al. (2015) postulated negative attitudes, triggers, 
motives, malicious intent, and motives are security concerns that need to be addressed.  
All reviewed literature directly supports insider threat mitigation attempts from the past 
and all relevant to the outcome of this study.  
In summary, non-behavioral literature reviews spanned approximately 400 
articles and selected the top 55 to cover 1999, through 2020, while behavioral literature 
included six theories dating back to 1979. All literature encompassed a multitude of 
content directly related to what has and has not worked within insider threat mitigation 
strategies. Ultimately, published works from Park, You, and Lee (2018) led this 
dissertation study to further examine sentiment exposed in social media.  
Research Question 2 asked: Was there relevance in behavioral theories, court 
transcripts from fraudulent cases, and social inputs that can solve the problem with the 
research? First, the existences of different behavioral theories were discovered within 
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each lab experiment, all aligned to fraud-related court cases, and shared one common 
behavioral theory; RAT (see Figure 43). In experiment one, the defendant situated 
himself into the trusted CEO position without mechanisms in place to prevent the 
embezzlement, and waited for the opportune time to execute the fraudulent act. In 
subsequent experiments, the defendants defrauded investors with various schemes and 
included fictitious businesses establishing collaborators such as managers, brokers, and 
processors to cover all aspects of the crime, all without protectors. In another instance, a 
contractor attempted to keep property belonging to a bank, and in all instances appeared 
to demonstrate an alignment to criminal acts requires convergence in space and time of 
likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against crime 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979).  
Second, the lessor behavioral theory; Theory of Planned Behavior appeared in 
experiments two, three, and four to demonstrate the insufficiency of following any type 
of behavioral control, antecedents of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control that leads to predictors with intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991). 
Furthermore, the Theory of Reasoned Action appeared in experiment four, and the 
Protection Motivation Theory appeared in experiment five (see Appendix X). In these 
instances, it appears through the knowledge of the preceding behavioral theories, there 
are likely ways organizations could mitigate the insider threat by implementing strategies 
to predict what people might do.  
Third, just as behavioral theories drawn from fraudulent court cases showed a 
significant value, the collecting of social input data from Twitter tweets provided 
supplemental inputs. The AffectiveTweets package scored with Bravo et al.’s (2015) 
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NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore, Baccianella et al.’s (2010) SentiWordnet-negScore, Bravo’s 
AFINN-negScore, and Bandhakavi et al.’s (2018) S140-negScoreAFIN (see Appendix K) 
to demonstrate relevancy within each experiment’s output (see Table 10).  
Table 10 
AffectiveTweets Scores 






















-0.180 -0.180 -2.148 -4.990 -2.410 -2.148 
 
In summary, there appears to be relevance in mitigating insider threats through 
the use of negative sentiment associated within the fraudulent context of social media. 
Furthermore, the discovery of repetitive behavioral theories might imply preventive 




Research Question 3 asked: What behavioral theories are most applicable to the 
research? Out of all behavioral theories, this dissertation study found the Routine Activity 
Theory common between the lab experiments. This research concurs with works by 
Cohen and Felson (1979) and the culmination of a suitable target, motivated offender, 
and the lack of an authority figure, allows criminal behaviors to develop. In every 
fraudulent case, Cohen and Felson’s theory is in alignment with the events leading to the 
actions of the insider threat (see Appendix Y). 
Research Question 4 asked: Can IT artifacts be created from the information 
obtained in behavioral theories, from court transcripts of fraudulent cases, and social 
inputs? The answer to this question is yes. First, after collecting court transcripts (see 
Table 11) from cases centered around fraudulent activities and documented in 138 pages 
of material, each case provided unique data that was paired against Hutto and Gilbert’s 
(2014) rule-based model for sentiment analysis. Second, each of the lab experiments 
leveraged the Weka package AffectiveTweets. According to Bravo-Marquez et al. (2019), 
the package is used to analyze sentiment found in the 20,000 social media Twitter tweets 
and was instrumental in gathering AffectiveTweets scoring (see Table 10). Scores with the 
lowest negative values reflect sentiment intensity, and appear to be useful when 
identifying a potential threat within tweets. Third, applicable behavioral theories were 
annotated by observations throughout (see Appendix Y) with correlations connecting 




Referenced Court Documents 
Court Assigned case number 
The Superior Court of California. County of Santa Clara 
 
SC-1903821 
The United States District Court, Northern District of 
California, San Francisco Division 
 
320-CR-00266 
The United States District Court, Northern District of 
California, San Francisco Division 
 
320-CR-00245 
The United States District Court, Northern District of 
California, San Francisco Division 
 
4-15-CV-01490 
The United States District Court, Northern District of 
Illinois 
3-16-CV-02600 
The United States District Court, Southern District of 
California. The Southern District 
 
3-16-CV-01547 
Lastly, each IT artifact’s creation began with Offermann et al.’s (2009) 
overarching design science research methodology to contribute to the uniform creation of 
each artifact (see Table 12) through the GPFLE process as outlined in the Result’s 
section. Furthermore, the IT artifact’s granular design leveraged works by Leoz and 
Petter (2018) to provide social aspects, behavioral aspects, and fraud-related aspects. 
Conversely, the technical component included information aspects, technology aspects, 





 Artifact 1 Artifact 2 Artifact 3 Artifact 4 Artifact 5 Artifact 6 
Applicable 
behavioral theories 
1 2 2 2 2 1 
Pages of court 
transcripts 
1 22 23  36 33 23 
Negative lexicons 
from tweets 
157 206 1846 5926 7515 3269 
       
       




Research Question 5 asked: Will each IT artifact yield favorable outcomes 
through lab experiments and contribute to the goal of the study? All IT artifacts were 
based on Offermann et al.’s (2009) DSR model and implemented Leoz and Petter’s 
(2018) artifact design with the majority of lab experiments producing what appears to be 
an expected outcome. The first lab experiment was limited in its data collections from 
court transcripts, and the artifact did not provide a significant outcome related to negative 
lexicons (see Appendix Q). However, in this instance, sufficient data did exist in order to 
correlate a behavioral theory (see Appendix Y) and reveal negative sentiment. For 
example, the AFINN score produced a -3.0 value and indicates the negative sentiment 
within the AFINN scale. Furthermore, the NRC attributes were derived from the word-
level emotion association lexicon for about 14,200 word types (Mohammad & Turney, 
2013) and produced a low HASH-SENT-negScore of -1.244.  
Other experiments contributed to the study by identifying lexicons, behavioral 
theories (see Appendix Y), and sentiment scores likely associated with fraudulent tweets 
(see Table 10). These sane experiments extended data collections and provided 206, 
1,846, 5,926, 7,515, and 3,269 classification instances for experiments two, three, four, 
five, and six. The dissertation study’s promising outcomes arrived from the review of 
each set of court documents (see Table 11), established negative associations that 
correlated to various tweets, effectively scored overall sentiment using AffectiveTweets 
to examine social media tweet sentiment, and applied Hutto’s (2014a) negative lexicons 
to demonstrate undesired conversations within tweets. Lastly, all outcomes appear 





The study demonstrated that sentiment found in social media data could 
illuminate negativity associated with different flavors of fraud. The various IT artifacts’ 
foundations were based on the unique cases on fraud and could be used by during the 
vetting process for employees, contractors, or business associates. Moreover, these 
research findings could contribute to a holistic solution to help mitigate insider threats 
and contribute to the body of knowledge.  
Recommendations 
First, as mentioned in the study's weaknesses, future research should explore 
support for additional languages and go beyond English (with permission of the author). 
Verhoeven, Daelemans, and Plank (2016) collected a sample of 65,000,000 tweets and 
found that Japanese, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and French are used most frequently 
after English (see Figure 45). An insignificant portion of the Twitter data in the present 
study reflected tweets in other languages. For instance, out of twenty-thousand tweets, 
Spanish accounted for twenty tweets, Estonian accounted for one tweet, French 
accounted for two tweets, Italian accounted for three tweets, Dutch accounted for five 




Figure 45. Distribution of languages (% of Tweets). Reprinted from “Twisty: A 
multilingual twitter stylometry corpus for gender and personality profiling,” by B. 
Verhoeven, W. Daelemans, and B. Plank, 2016, Proceedings of the Tenth International 
Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation, 1632–1637. Adapted with 
permission. 
Second, further expansion beyond fraud is needed to target specific forms of 
white-collar crimes, as previously mentioned. Expanding to other forms of crime could 
yield a wealth of data and benefit organizations’ mitigation efforts.  
Furthermore, other social media tools could be leveraged. This dissertation study 
did not realize many of the initial up-front and technical challenges; thus, dealt with 
problematic issues in on-premises processing and analyzing data for various 
technological reasons. A later discovery led to more tools with many of companies 
offering trial periods, discounted pricing, and some required purchasing. However, due to 
cloud privacy concerns, caution should be used when using products that are eager to 
place data in cloud hosting environments. The following (see Table 13) are a list of 








Comprehend Amazon Comprehend is a natural language processing (NLP) service that uses 
machine learning to discover insights from text (Amazon.com, 2021). 
 
TalkWalker AI powered analysis provides real time insights into what's happening on all 
social channels and online media, across 187 languages (Talkwalker.com, 2021). 
 
Tableau Desktop Visual analytics displays interactive dashboards help you uncover hidden 
insights on the fly (Tableau.com, 2021). 
 
DataRobot DataRobot is the leading end-to-end enterprise AI platform that automates and 
accelerates every step of your path from data to value (DataRobot.com, 2021). 
 
RapidMiner According to RapidMiner.com (2021), the product provides a comprehensive 
data science platform to utilize automation and visual workflow design.  
MLbase According to MLbase.org (2021), MLbase is distributed machine learning 
consisting of three components. MLlib, MLI, and ML Optimizer, to address 
issues with implementing and consuming machine learning tasks. 
 
BigML BigML is a consumable, programmable, and scalable Machine Learning 
platform that makes it easy to solve and automate  
Classification, Regression, Time Series Forecasting, Cluster Analysis, Anomaly 
Detection, Association Discovery, and Topic Modeling tasks (BigML.com, 
2021). 
 
Datawrapper Enrich your stories with charts, maps, and tables (Datawrapper.de, 2021). 
 
Visualr Visualr is a Data Visualization and Analytics Platform that will help your 
organization to convert raw data into insights in the form of interactive 
Dashboards and Analytical Reports, from different data sources (Visualr.io, 
2021), and is capable of handling data in the terabytes.  
 
Paxata Paxata provides a self-service data preparation solution for business and 
technical teams to visually clean, integrate, and govern data at scale (Paxata.com, 
2021).  
 
Trifacta  Trifacta provides visual and intelligent guidance to accelerate data preparation so 






The opening chapter introduced the background of insider threats through an 
extensive examination of past, current, and future directions of insider threat activities. 
Previous postures demonstrated a reactive stance, which often require additional 
personnel and technology support (Wallace & Loffi, 2014). This dissertation study 
closely explored the social media sentiments presented by Gritzalis et al. (2014), who 
postulated that online content provides characteristics of individuals who demonstrate 
traits of a potential insider threat.  
This dissertation study applied 11 steps from a DSR methodology that led to the 
creation of IT artifacts. Multiple sources of data collections, analysis, instrument 
development, and validation provided the sentiment scores and negative sentiment 
classifications that contributed to identifying insider threats from an earlier stage within 
social media data. Similarly, research by Park et al. (2018) included social media data 
and behavioral theories, which provided the foundation for this study. Such information 
contributed to the relevancy of moving towards proactive measures. 
Several theories were more applicable than others. For instance, the general 
deterrence theory and the social bond theory did not appear to be associated with any of 
the court input streams. However, the protection motivation theory, TRA, the RPB, and 
the RAT appeared to be associated with the same set of cases, with the most prominent 
being the RAT and the TPB. The latter two theories may have been most prominent 
simply because of similarities within the court cases. 
The summary of results below illustrates that all artifact Tweet analyses were 
paired with negative sentiments extracted from the various forms of fraudulent court 
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cases. Although this dissertation study did anticipate retrieving positive sentiments, it did 
not show bias by restricting such data. Instead, focus on negative sentiments led to the 
prediction of insider threats. Within the artifact Tweet analysis, all Tweet filtering 
measures for each artifact are listed in columns 1–27, with the lowest negative score 
representing the point of interest as shown in columns 1, 4, 20, and 25 (see Figure 46). 
 
Figure 46. Artifact Tweet analysis. 
 
Additionally, some instances represented extreme levels of negative sentiment 
which were classified under sentiment weights, such as NRC-Hash-Sent-negScores, 
SentiWordnet-negScores, and AFINN-negScores. Recognizing these types of sentiment 
scores as applied to social media analysis could expose fraud-related insider threats 
during preemployment vetting. The negative sentiments could provide HR with another 




Appendix A:  




'* Program: FixSentimentWeights 
'*        Date: 06-09-2020 
'*           By: Robert W. Jones 
'*   Purpose: Create a new source file from the original VADER lexicon file to correct 
'*                  issues with either missing weights and deleted a record at position 825 
'*                  that appeared to cause issues when reading. The output file has every 
'*                  piece of information verbatim to the master input. To correct an issue 
'*                  that caused WEKA to error when reading, the output from this program did 
'*                  require opening the new output file in NotePad, then as an ANSI file (as 




Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename 
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination filename 
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out 
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in 
Dim nStartPos As Byte = 0 'Numeric start position 
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out 
Dim nFilePosition As Integer = 0 'Numeric file positioning 
 
sSource = "C:\DISS901-3\vaderSentiment-master\vaderSentiment\vader_lexicon2.arff" 
sDestination = "C:\DISS901-3\vaderSentiment-master\vaderSentiment\vader_lexicon_gold.arff" 
 
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile 
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False) 
Try 
 
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSource) = True Then 
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource) 
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() 
nFilePosition += 1 
If nFilePosition <= 6 Then 'No changes until after record 6 
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn) 
Else 
'After record 6, then process and make changes in destination file 
nStartPos = InStr(sRecordIn, ",", CompareMethod.Text) + 1 
sOut = Mid(sRecordIn, nStartPos, 4) 
file.WriteLine(RTrim(sRecordIn) + ",{" + sOut + "}") 
End If 




Appendix A continued: 
 
Fix Sentiment Weights 
 
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSource) 






Catch ex As Exception 










Background on VADER lexicons 
 
VADER was empirically validated using multiple and independent judges when 
establishing the “gold-standard” with sentiment that leverages blog-like contexts. 
Lexicons implements both polarity and intensity of sentiments tuned to social media. 
According to C.J. Hutto (2014), 
 
Sentiment ratings from 10 independent human raters (all pre-screened, trained, 
and quality checked for optimal inter-rater reliability). Over 9,000 token features 
were rated on a scale from "[–4] Extremely Negative" to "[4] Extremely Positive", 
with allowance for "[0] Neutral (or Neither, N/A)". We kept every lexical feature 
that had a non-zero mean rating, and whose standard deviation was less than 2.5 
as determined by the aggregate of those ten independent raters. This left us with 
just over 7,500 lexical features with validated valence scores that indicated both 
the sentiment polarity (positive/negative), and the sentiment intensity on a scale 
from –4 to +4. For example, the word "okay" has a positive valence of 0.9, "good" 
is 1.9, and "great" is 3.1, whereas "horrible" is –2.5, the frowning emoticon :( is –
2.2, and "sucks" and it's slang derivative "sux" are both –1.5. Manually creating a 
comprehensive sentiment lexicon is a labor intensive and sometimes error prone 
process, so it is no wonder that many opinion mining researchers and practitioners 
rely so heavily on existing lexicons as primary resources. We are pleased to offer 
ours as a new resource. We began by constructing a list inspired by examining 
existing well-established sentiment word-banks (LIWC, ANEW, and GI). We 
empirically confirmed the general applicability of each feature candidate to 
sentiment expressions using a wisdom-of-the-crowd (WotC) approach 
(Surowiecki, 2004) to acquire a valid point estimate for the sentiment valence 





































Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output 
 
Figure D1 



























































'* Program: AssignWeightsToCourtLexicons                                            
'*       Date: 06-09-2020                                                              
'*          By: Robert W. Jones and AutomateExcel.com use of modified extact_number()   
'*  Purpose: After PDFs are converted to Excel, then sorted and saved to TEXT,       
'*                 this program reads the TEXT file, and creates a new output file         
'*                 with the content from the input, and paired with associate sentiment    
'*                 weight from C.J. Hutto (2014) sentiment weights. The output should      
'*                 be read into WEKA, along with Twitter data and have sentiment analysis  
'*                 performed.                      
'*********************************************************************************** 
Dim sLexicon(7065) As String 'Array to store sentiment lexicons 
Dim sWeight(7065) As String 'Array to store sentiment weights 
Dim nPointer As Integer = 0 'Integer pointer 
Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename 
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination output filename 
Dim sSourceSentiment As String = "" 'Source sentiment filename 
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'Record out 
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'Record in 
Dim stemp1 As String = "" 'Temp string 
Dim stemp2 As String = "" 'Temp string 
Dim bFound As Boolean = False 'Booleam for finding match 
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'Integer for processing array 
Dim nFreeFile1 As Integer 'File handle 




'Source file was created from using iSkySoft to convert the court PDF file(s) into a text file that was 
cleaned up from duplicates using Excel, and sorted in ascending order. 
sSource = "C:\DISS901-3\Artifact Lab Results\CA-C1903821.TXT" 
             
'Destination file uses the sSource and rewrites it, so the sentiments weighted value is included. If no 
sentiment weight is found, a zero is assigned. 
sDestination = "C:\DISS901-3\Artifact Lab Results\CA-C1903821-ReadyForWEKA.TXT" 
'Source file for reading sentiment values 
sSourceSentiment = "C:\DISS901-3\vaderSentiment-master\vaderSentiment\vader_lexicon_txt.txt" 
 
'Open the VADER sentiment as sSourceSentiment (Read Only) 
'Read into two dim array (for faster processing) 
'Close the VADER sentiment sSourceSentiment file 
 





Appendix E continued: 
 
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons 
            
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceSentiment) 
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() 
'Pull values into arrays 
stemp1 = Mid$(sRecordIn, 1, InStr(1, sRecordIn, vbTab, CompareMethod.Text) - 1) 'This is working and 
only pulling the sentiment. 
stemp2 = Extract_Number(sRecordIn) 'This is working and only pulling weights. 
sLexicon(nPointer) = stemp1 
sWeight(nPointer) = stemp2 
nPointer += 1 
Loop 
 
'Close sentiment file when done reading into array 
FileClose(nFreeFile1) 
 
'Open the output file for writing. 
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False) 
 
'Open the court data file as sSource (Read only) 
Dim objReadersSource As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource) 
Do While objReadersSource.Peek() <> -1 
bFound = False 
sRecordIn = objReadersSource.ReadLine() 
'Search array to find weight. If found, write to output file with new weight. If not found, write to new file 
with a zero weight. 
For nCtr = 0 To 7065 Step 1 
If RTrim(sRecordIn) = RTrim(sLexicon(nCtr)) Then 
bFound = True 
Exit For 'No need to keep looking once a match is found 
End If 
Next 
'Write whichever is needed 
If bFound = True Then 
file.WriteLine(RTrim(sRecordIn) & " " & sWeight(nCtr)) 'Write matched weight 
Else 






Catch ex As Exception 
MsgBox("AssignWeightsToCourtLexicons has encountered an error and unable to continue.") 
 
 End Try 







Appendix E continued: 
 
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons 
 
Function Extract_Number(Phrase As String) As String 
Dim Length_of_String As Integer 
Dim Current_Pos As Integer 
Dim Temp As String 
Length_of_String = Len(Phrase) 
Temp = "" 
For Current_Pos = 1 To Length_of_String 
If (Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1) = "-") Then 
Temp = Temp & Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1) 
End If 
If (Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1) = ".") Then 
Temp = Temp & Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1) 
End If 
If (IsNumeric(Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1))) = True Then 




If Len(Temp) = 0 Then 
Extract_Number = 0 
Else 








Appendix F  
Convert Twitter Tweets into Fixed Words 
 
‘'*********************************************************************************** 
 '* Program: ConvertTwitterToWords                                            
 '*       Date: 06-16-2020                                                              
 '*          By: Robert W. Jones  
 '*                 Purpose: Read the 20,000 tweets from the master CSV file and convert into plain text. 
 '*           
 '*********************************************************************************** 
 'Sub Main() 
  Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename 
  Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination filename 
  Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out 
  Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in 
  Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out 
  Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'For loop counter 
 
  sSource = "C:\DISS901-3\Tweets\TwitterMasterGold-CSV.csv" 
  sDestination = "C:\DISS901-3\Tweets\Twitter.txt" 
  Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile 
  file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False) 
 
  Try 
  If System.IO.File.Exists(sSource) = True Then 
  Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource) 
  Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 
   sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() 
   sOut = "" 'Reinitialize 
   For nCtr = 1 To Len(RTrim(sRecordIn)) Step 1 
   If Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) <> Space(1) Then 
   If Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = "?" Then 
   sOut = sOut & "'" 'Convert it as it causes issues 
   ElseIf Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = "." Then 
   sOut = sOut & " " 'Convert it as it causes issues 
   ElseIf Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = "," Then 
   sOut = sOut & " " 'Convert it as it causes issues 
   ElseIf Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = Chr(34) Then 
   sOut = sOut & " " 'Convert it as it causes issues 
   Else 
   sOut = sOut & Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) 'Build the word 
   End If    Next 
    Loop 'Read all input records from tweet master CSV file  
    Else 
    MsgBox("Error opening " & sSource) 
    Exit Sub 'Unable to open the source Twitter tweets data file 
    End If 
    'Close file 
    file.Close() 
    Catch ex As Exception 




Appendix F continued: 
 
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons 
      
     End Try 







Sequencer1 reads each line from court documents(s), looks up Hutto matches and 
records into a HITS file; used in later analysis by Sequencer2. 
 
'*********************************************************************************** 
'* Program: Sequence1                                            
'*       Date: 06-16-2020                                                              
'*          By: Robert W. Jones  
'*  Purpose: Read each line from court document(s) - referred to as CCxxxxxxx.txt, and 
'*               : look-up in Hutto.txt file. If match is found, write output file as Hits.txt 
'*               : with matching sentiment and weight (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If match is not 
'*               : found, write to same file with a neutral zero weight (i.e., word, 0.0). 
'*********************************************************************************** 
Dim sSourceC As String = "" 'Source filename for court document 
Dim sSourceH As String = "" 'Source filename for Hutto file 
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination Hits file 
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out 
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in 
Dim nStartPos As Byte = 0 'Numeric start position 
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out 
Dim nFilePosition As Integer = 0 'Numeric file positioning 
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'Used in array for loop 
Dim sHuttoLexicon(7064) As String 'Hold Hutto lexicons 
Dim bFound As Boolean = False 'Found a match 
Dim sHuttoTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp lexicon strings 
Dim sCourtTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp court strings 
Dim nCourtRecs As Long = 0 'Represent all court records 
 
sSourceC = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\CA-C1903821.txt" 
sSourceH = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Hutto.txt" 
sDestination = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Hits.txt" 
 
'Place sentiments into an array for faster processing. 
Dim objReaderH As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceH) 
Do While objReaderH.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire court documents 
nCtr = nCtr + 1 
sRecordIn = objReaderH.ReadLine() 'Read line 
sHuttoLexicon(nCtr) = sRecordIn 'Assign to array 
Loop 'Read all Hutto lexicons data   
objReaderH.Close() 
 
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile 




If System.IO.File.Exists(sSourceC) = True Then 
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceC) 




Appendix G continued: 
 
Sequencer1 reads each line from court documents(s), looks up Hutto matches and 
records into a HITS file; used in later analysis by Sequencer2. 
 
bFound = False 
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() & Space(1) 'Helps reduce false hits (i.e., court is not scored to 
courteous) 
'See if match is found in Hutto array 
For nCtr = 1 To 7064 Step 1 
 
'Attempt to make each words ready for comparisons 
sCourtTemp = LCase(RTrim(sRecordIn)) 
sHuttoTemp = LCase(RTrim(Replace(sHuttoLexicon(nCtr), vbTab, " "))) 
sHuttoTemp = RTrim(Mid(sHuttoTemp, 1, InStr(1, sHuttoTemp, " "))) 
 
'If InStr(1, LCase(sHuttoLexicon(nCtr)), LCase(RTrim(sRecordIn))) > 0 Then 'Match is found and not 
empty! 
If (sCourtTemp = sHuttoTemp) Then 
file.WriteLine(sHuttoLexicon(nCtr)) 
nCourtRecs += 1 
bFound = True 
'Exit For 'As soon as a match is found, move on to save time.  
End If 
Next 
'If here and no match was found, write record in Hits with a zero weight. 
If bFound = False Then 
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn & Space(5) & "0.0") 
End If 
Loop 'Read all court data   
Else 
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSourceC) 





MsgBox("Data saved to " & sDestination) 
 
Catch ex As Exception 










Sequencer2 reads each line from the HITS file and look-up possible hits in the Twitter 
master file. Recording the tweet hits, and weights. If matches are not found, then the 
lexicon is recorded with a zero weight. 
 
'*********************************************************************************** 
'* Program: Sequence2                                            
'*       Date: 06-17-2020                                                              
'*          By: Robert W. Jones  
'*  Purpose: Read each line from HITS and look-up possible hits in the Twitter file. 
'*               : If matching tweets exists, record the lexicon and number of times 
'*               : found (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If match is not found, write to same file 
'*               : using a zero weight as 0.0.  
‘*********************************************************************************** 
Dim sSourceHits As String = "" 'Source filename for HITS document 
Dim sSourceTwitter As String = "" 'Source filename for Twitter file 
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination Found-In-Social-Media file 
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in 
Dim nCtr As Long = 0 'Used in array for loop 
Dim sTweetedWords(382830) As String 'Hold Twitter tweets 
Dim bFound As Boolean = False 'Found a match 
Dim nTweetRecs As Long = 0 'Count matching tweets 
Dim sTwitterTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp twitter strings 
Dim sHITsTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp HITS strings 
Dim nCourtRecs As Long = 0 'Represent all court records 
 
sSourceHits = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Hits.txt"         
sSourceTwitter = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Twitter.txt" 
sDestination = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Found-In-Social-Media.txt" 
 
'Place large twitter words an array for faster processing. 
Dim objReaderH As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceTwitter) 
Do While objReaderH.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire twitter tweets 
nCtr = nCtr + 1 
sRecordIn = objReaderH.ReadLine() 'Read line 
sTweetedWords(nCtr) = sRecordIn 'Assign to array 
Loop 'Read all Hutto lexicons data   
objReaderH.Close() 
 
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile 
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False) 
'Write a header for the csv and WEKA 




If System.IO.File.Exists(sSourceHits) = True Then 




Appendix H continued: 
 
Sequencer2 reads each line from the HITS file and look-up possible hits in the Twitter 
master file. Recording the tweet hits, and weights. If matches are not found, then the 
lexicon is recorded with a zero weight. 
 
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire HITS document 
bFound = False 
nTweetRecs = 0 
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() 
 
'See if match(es) are found in TWITTER file 
For nCtr = 1 To 382830 Step 1 
'Attempt to make each words ready for comparisons 
sHITsTemp = LCase(RTrim(sRecordIn)) 
sHITsTemp = RTrim(Mid(sHITsTemp, 1, InStr(1, sHITsTemp, " "))) 
 
sTwitterTemp = LCase(RTrim(sTweetedWords(nCtr))) 
 
If (sTwitterTemp <> "") And (sHITsTemp <> "") Then 'Only records with content 
If (sHITsTemp = sTwitterTemp) Then 
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn) 
nTweetRecs += 1 





'If here write records to output file, along with hits; but only if nTweetRecs <> 0. 
If bFound = True Then 
If nTweetRecs <> 0 Then 
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn & Space(5) & "hits = " & Str(nTweetRecs)) 
End If 
End If 
Loop 'Read all HITS data   
Else 
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSourceHits) 





MsgBox("Data saved to " & sDestination) 
 
Catch ex As Exception 
MsgBox("Sequence2 has encountered an error and unable to continue.", ex.Message) 
End Try 








PDF-Text-ToProcessedText reads each line from the iSkysoft PDF converted Text file 
and writes out a new text file that includes corrections to formatting. The output is later 
used by other programs.  
 
'*********************************************************************************** 
'* Program: PDF-Text-ToProcessedText                                            
'*    Date: 07-04-2020                                                              
'*      By: Robert W. Jones    
'* Purpose: After PDFs are converted to text with iSkysoft, this program creates a        
'*          text file to be used in other programs' processing of data. The iSkysoft 
'*          text is in an unformatted layout. 
'*********************************************************************************** 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Dim sArrayOfWords(65000) As String 'Array to hold words and check for dups 
    Dim nArrayOfWordsCounter As Integer 'Keep track of how many words to check 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load 
        
'*********************************************************************************** 
        '* Program: PDF-Text-ToProcessedText                                            
        '*    Date: 07-04-2020                                                              
        '*      By: Robert W. Jones    
        '* Purpose: After PDFs are converted to text with iSkysoft, this program creates a        
        '*          text file to be used in other programs' processing of data. The iSkysoft 
        '*          text is in an unformatted layout. 
        
'*********************************************************************************** 
Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename 
Dim sSourceNew As String = "" 'Source from output, used as input 
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination filename 
Dim sDestinationNoDups As String = "" 'No duplicates in final output 
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out 
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in 
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out 
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'For loop counter 
Dim nTotalWords As Integer = 0 'Record words processed 
 
sSource = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact3-Experiment3\320-cr-00245.txt" 
sDestination = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact3-Experiment3\320-cr-00245.out" 
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile 
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False) 
 
Try 
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSource) = True Then 
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource) 
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() 




Appendix I continued: 
 
PDF-Text-ToProcessedText reads each line from the iSkysoft PDF converted Text file 
and writes out a new text file that includes corrections to formatting. The output is later 
used by other programs.  
 
For nCtr = 1 To Len(RTrim(sRecordIn)) Step 1 
'If not a space, build the word 
If Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) <> Space(1) And Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) <> "." And Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) 
<> "," Then 
sOut = sOut & Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) 'This is how to build a good word. 
 
Else 
'If here, only write records that are over three characters long 
If Len(RTrim(sOut)) >= 3 Then 
'Track the word count for duplicate checking 
If IsDuplicate(sOut) = False Then 'If word has not already been written, record it and write it. 
'Track the word count for duplicate checking 
nArrayOfWordsCounter = nArrayOfWordsCounter + 1 
sArrayOfWords(nArrayOfWordsCounter) = sOut 
file.WriteLine(sOut) 
'Track the total words 
nTotalWords = nTotalWords + 1 
sOut = "" 
End If 
Else 




Loop 'Read all input records from master text file  
Else 
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSource) 
Exit Sub 'Unable to open the court data file 
End If 
 'Write remaining buffer, then close file 
file.WriteLine(sOut) 
file.Close() 
Catch ex As Exception 
MsgBox("Convert PDF text to processed words has encountered an error and unable to continue.") 
End Try 
 




Function IsDuplicate(sWord As String) As Boolean 
Dim nDupCtr As Integer 
 
IsDuplicate = False 
 
For nDupCtr = 1 To nArrayOfWordsCounter Step 1 
If LCase(sArrayOfWords(nDupCtr)) = LCase(sWord) Then 




Appendix I continued: 
 
PDF-Text-ToProcessedText reads each line from the iSkysoft PDF converted Text file 
and writes out a new text file that includes corrections to formatting. The output is later 

















Descriptions for Negative Sentiments 
NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore – Words are annotated according to eight emotions: joy, trust, 
sadness, anger, surprise, fear, anticipation, and disgust, and two polarity classes: positive 
and negative. There are many words that are not as- sociated with any emotional state and 
are tagged as neutral (Bravo-Marquez, Frank, & Pfahringer, 2015). 
SentiWordnet-negScore – A lexical resource explicitly devised for supporting sentiment 
classification and opinion mining (Baccianella, Esuli, & Sebastiani, 2010) that relates to 
the highest top ten ranked negative synsets. 
AFINN-negScore – Negative words scored from -1 to -5, includes slang, obscene words, 
acronyms and Web jargon (Bravo-Marquez, Frank, & Pfahringer, 2015). 
S140-negScore – According to Bandhakavi, Wiratunga, and Massie (2018), emotion-
aware polarity lexicons for Twitter Sentiment Analysis uses Twitter API, to include a 
collection of 177 negative manually annotated tweets, yet includes a collection to 1.6 
million sourced tweets.  
 
While other negative sentiment attributes exist within the WEKA package 
AffectiveTweets, the antecedent was the only attributes carrying the lowest values, and 





Random Tree Illustration from Experiment 1 
 
The root sentiment weight has two possible initial paths. For the experiment, 
values less than 0.95 are first noted. This leads to the left of the tree with possible paths 
of less than -0.45 and values greater. Focus is on the left branch and leads to lexicon 
weights of less than -1.85 or greater than or equal to this value. Both ending nodes carry 
significance. The first being the class of felony 1/0 and complaints 3/0. This means both 
nodes’ data was discovered within tweets that might correlate to fraud. This is important 
at an organizational level within the preemployment vetting, just as negative scoring 








Kappa is widely accepted in the field of content analysis (Carletta, 1996) and is 
used to assess the agreement or reliability between two observers who are performing a 
test which has a categorical variable (McLintic, 2009). According to Sahoo (2013), 
classifiers provide greater accuracy when Kappa statistic is greater than zero. According 
to McHugh (2012), the interpretation of Cohen’s (1960) Kappa development suggests the 
following Kappa results. This study’s lab experiments found the Kappa statistics in the 
range for substantial, or a nearly perfect agreement ranging from 0.763 to 1.0.  
 
 
0 = No agreement 
0.01–0.20 = Slight agreement 
0.21–0.40 = Fair agreement 
0.41– 0.60 = Moderate agreement 
0.61–0.80 = Substantial agreement  
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Experiment 1 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
complaint (-1.2) felony (-2.5)  
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
active parties  
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 






Experiment 2 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
assets credits fraud (-2.8) 
liability (-0.8) promises substantial 
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
creating shares  
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
created hide (-0.7) legal 






Experiment 3 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
acceptance approval assets 
credits determination determined 
felony (-2.5) gains granting 
imposed (-0.3) improvement liability (-0.8) 
losses (-1.7) mandatory offenses (-1.5) 
promises questioned (-0.4) recommended 
secured suspended (-2.1) victims (-1.3) 
violation (-2.2) violence (-3.1) weapon (-1.2) 
wells   
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
arrested (-2.1) conspiracy (-2.4) engaged 
entitled error (-1.7) victim (-1.1) 
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
ability abuse (-3.2) accept 
accepted accepting agreement 
allow approved benefit 
commit committed credit 
crime (-2.5) criminal (-2.4) dangerous (-2.1) 
dear death (-2.9) defense 
effective fine fit 
fraud (-2.8) grant gross (-2.1) 
guilty (-1.8) honorable injury (-1.8) 
interest justice leave (-0.2) 
loss (-1.3) low (-1.1) matter 
number offense (-1.0) original 
outstanding parties pay (-0.4) 
please risk (-1.1) safety 
secure sentence smart 






Experiment 4 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
admits advanced approval 
asset assured awarded 
benefits cancer (-3.4) charities 
commitment complained (-1.7) complaint (-1.2) 
complaints (-1.7) deceive (-1.7) deceived (-1.9) 
delay (-1.3) denying (-1.4) effectively 
engaged ensure entitled 
excluded (-1.4) extends fail (-2.5) 
failing (-2.3) fails (-1.8) faulty (-1.3) 
greater increase increased 
lawsuit (-0.9) misleading (-1.7) offends (-2.0) 
oppressive (-1.7) profits promote 
questioned (-0.4) recommended recommends 
refused (-1.2) responsible safest 
safety satisfied saved 
substantial suffer (-2.5) suffered (-2.2) 
trusting unaware (-0.8) unethical (-2.3) 
unfair (-2.1) violate (-2.2) violation (-2.2) 
violations (-2.4) warn (-0.4)  
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
acceptable agree attacks (-1.9) 
award care certain 
challenges clear committed 
creates cut (-1.1) desire 
devastating (-3.3) dream engage 
engaging exclusive exposed (-0.3) 
failed (-2.3) fair giving 
guarantee hard (-0.4) harm (-2.5) 
honest immoral (-2.0) important 
injured (-1.7) injury (-1.8) interest 
interests legal lies (-1.8) 
limited (-0.9) lost (-1.3) low (-1.1) 
lower (-1.2) matter matters 
no (-1.2) parties party 
please problems (-1.7) protect 
punish (-2.4) refuse (-1.2) relief 
respect risk (-1.1) risks (-1.1) 
safe scare (-2.2) serious (-0.3) 
share significant strong 
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Appendix T continued: 
Experiment 4 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
superior Support sure 
top trouble (-1.7) truth 
united Value want 
well wrong (-2.1) yes 
 
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
admitted Best demand (-0.5) 
fight (-1.6) fraud (-2.8) growing 






Experiment 5 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
 active actively 
approval avoided (-1.4) awarded 
benefit boosted burdens (-1.5) 
challenges cleaner complaint (-1.2) 
deceive (-1.7) deceived (-1.9) deception (-1.9) 
delay (-1.3) determination determined 
dispute (-1.7) disregard (-1.1) efficient 
engaging ensure excluded (-1.4) 
exploiting (-1.9) failures (-2.0) futile (-1.9) 
grossly (-0.9) harmed (-2.1) harsh (-1.9) 
hoax (-1.1) immoral (-2.0) improvements 
inability (-1.7) increased innovative  
liability (-0.8) losses (-1.7) misleading (-1.7) 
offend (-1.2) parties profit 
profits promise protects 
punish (-2.4) reckless (-1.7) relief 
respective responsible satisfied 
satisfy shared sluggish (-1.7) 
sophisticated stinky (-1.5) substantial 
touted (-0.2) trusted uncertain (-1.2) 
unethical (-2.3) unfair (-2.1) unjust (-2.3) 
value victims (-1.3) violated (-2.4) 
violation (-2.2) violations (-2.4) virtue 
vision   
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
ability accomplish active 
actively admit authority 
award benefits better 
burden (-1.9) care certain 
clean clear committed 
confidence confusion (-1.2) create 
created creates defeat (-2.0) 
defense delay (-1.3) difficult (-1.5) 
effective engaged entitled 
escape exclusive failed (-2.3) 
failure (-2.3) fair fit 
fraud (-2.8) free friendly 




Appendix U continued: 
Experiment 5 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
admitted alone (-1.0) best 
great illegal (-2.6) injury (-1.8) 






Experiment 6 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
abuse (-3.2) admits admitted 
asset assurances avoided (-1.4) 
committing compelled competition 
complained (-1.7) complaint (-1.2) consent 
demanded (-0.9) demanding (-0.9) destruction (-2.7) 
determined disregard (-1.1) efficient 
engaged engagement ensuring 
entitled extends favor 
favors hacked (-1.7) harmed (-2.1) 
integrity intellectual merits 
preventing (-0.1) profit profits 
promises refused (-1.2) refusing (-1.7) 
respectfully restricting (-1.6) secured 
substantial suspected (-0.9) threatened (-2.0) 
threatens (-1.6) threats (-1.8) unacceptable (-2.0) 
unethical (-2.3) unjust (-2.3) violate (-2.2) 
violated (-2.4) violation (-2.2) virtue 
   
 
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
advantage authority benefit 
benefits destroying (-2.6) enjoyed 
failing (-2.3) failure (-2.3) greater 
lawsuit (-0.9) protected relief 
secure steal (-2.2) suffered (-2.2) 
threatening (-2.4) united valuable 
worthy   
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
agree agreed agreement 
alone (-1.0) award certain 
clear committed created 
credit crime (-2.5) criminal (-2.4) 
damage (-2.2) demand (-0.5) destroy (-2.5) 
difficult (-1.5) easily excuse 
failed (-2.3) fraud (-2.8) giving 
great gross (-2.1) harm (-2.5) 
illegal (-2.6) interest legal 
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Appendix V continued: 
Experiment 6 TPR and FPR Results 
 
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons 
 
lies (-1.8) limited (-0.9) loss (-1.3) 
lost (-1.3) low (-1.1) matter  
number original parties 
party please prevent 
promise promised protect 
respect security share 
steal (-2.2) stop (-1.2) success 
suffer (-2.5) Support threat (-2.4) 






Summary from Experiments 
 
Experiment TPR FPR Precision Kappa Classification Theory Negative 
Lexicons 
1 0.873 0.039 0.539 0.8055 Trees Random 
Forest 
RAT 2 










4 0.700 0.005 0.736 0.6822 Naive Bayes TRA / 
RAT 
58 
5 0.780 0.004 0.995 0.7588 Naive Bayes PMT / 
RAT 
48 








Behavioral Theories within Lab Experiments 
 
Experiment Theory 
1 Routine Activity Theory 
2 Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior 
3 Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior 
4 Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Reasoned Action 
5 Routine Activity Theory / Protection Motivation Theory 






Behavioral Theory Correlations within Lab Experiments 
 
Experiment Theory Correlation 
1 Routine Activity Theory   The turn of unfortunate events shared by 
D’Addona (2019) aligns with the RAT. In this 
instance, the offender leveraged his tenure and 
promotions through the ranks to place himself in 
a position with access to financial components 
within the organization. According to Cohen & 
Felson’s (1979), definition of RAT. The  
circumstances surrounding the embezzlement was 
demonstrated through the lack of capable 
guardians against criminal activities, and the 
offender sought suitable targets; all in alignment 
with the theory. 
2 Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior   After reviewing the court’s news release and 
reviewing the case as filed with the courts, this 
particular case appeared to align with two 
behavioral theories: the RAT and the TPB. As 
Cohen and Felson (1979) posited, unlawful 
activities are brought together through conditions 
exhibited in this case, along with investors (the 
targets) and lacked protectors to these types of 
criminal activities. Equally, the TPB 
demonstrates the insufficiency of following any 
type of behavioral control, antecedents of 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control that lead to predictors with 
intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991).  
3 Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior   Review of the court’s case appeared to align 
with two behavioral theories: the RAT and the 
TPB. As in the previous experiment and 
applicable is Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory 
with unlawful activities coming together through 
conditions exhibited in this case; along with 
banks and credit unions (the targets) and lacked 
protectors to these types of criminal activities. 
Equally important, the TPB demonstrates the 
insufficiency of following any type of behavioral 
control, antecedents of attitudes, subjective 
norms, and perceived behavioral control that lead 
to predictors with intentions and actions (Ajzen, 
1991), and appears to be demonstrated by greed. 
The offenders appeared to target investors who 
were all blind-eyed to activities outside of their 
knowledge using an elaborate strategy of being in 





Appendix Y continued: 
Behavioral Theory Correlations within Lab Experiments 
 
Experiment Theory Correlation 
4 Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Reasoned 
Action 
  The impact of Artifact 4 included both business 
partners and consumers and appeared to fall 
within two theories. The theory of reasoned 
action (TRA) is used to reveal the meaningful 
effects of attitudes and subjective norms. In this 
particular case, the business appeared to follow a 
subjective norm common with other business 
owners’ practices. The behavior is in alignment 
with Hale, Householder and Greene’s (2002) 
assessment to subjective norms. Similarly, the 
business specifically sought suitable targets in 
the absence of guardians against crime (Cohen 
& Felson, 1979) in order to carry out their 
business practices and part of the routine activity 
theory (RAT). 
5 Routine Activity Theory / Protection Motivation 
Theory 
  The theories that correlate best with this case 
are protection motivation theory (PMT) and 
routine activity theory (RAT). Protection 
motivation theory represents the cognitive 
processes to mediate the persuasive effects of a 
fear appeal by arousing protection motivation. In 
this case, it appears dwindling sales was a 
motivation and according to Maddux and Rogers 
(1983), the protection motivation came from 
self-preservation with keeping the business 
afloat. Furthermore, one could theorize the 
danger felt by the manufacturer might be 
construed with the fear from competitors and led 
to the business finding suitable targets; the 
consumer and in alignment with RAT. 
6 Routine Activity Theory    Similarly with other experiments’ 
interpretation with behavioral theories, RAT 
best applies to this case. In this instance, the 
contractor appeared to knowingly select a target 
thought to be incapable of defending itself, 
which revealed the absence of capable guardians 
against crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). 
However, what the contractor did not realize at 
the time was the bank’s trade secrets on the 
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